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PREFACE
This study began on the happy coincidence of 
encountering Wallach and Kogan's book "Modes of Thinking in 
Young Children" while reading an article on cognitive cont­
rols. The possible relevance of cognitive controls to 
creativity immediately suggested itself. A survey of the 
literature indicated that considerable work had been done 
on the individual controls. Little investigation, however, 
had been conducted in regard to a) cognitive controls as 
a constellation b) their relationship to creativity and 
c) their functioning in children. This study was concerned 
with these three basic issues. Piaget's general epi stomolo gf 
ical model was adopted to encompass these issues in full 
realization that the end result might bear little relevance 
to his conception of it.
I wish to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to my 
mentor, Or. B. P Rourke, whose direction and clarification 
was helpful and supportive throughout the past year; Dr. D.
N. Jackson, the outside examiner, was constructively crit­
ical and very much appreciated. Thanks are due as well to 
the three readers Dr. R. C. Fehr, Dr. R. M. Daly and Mr. M. 
Starr. David Seaton performed a much appreciated task in 
conducting the computer analyses. A special thanks is due 
my wife Pat for her support and encouragement during the 
past few months.
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ABSTRACT
This study was concerned with a) the individual's 
encounter with his environment and b) the dimensions by 
which the individual organizes this encounter. The 
theoretical perspective adopted was Piaget's conception of 
intelligence as involving adaptation and organization. The 
modes of the individual's adaptation considered were intell­
igence and creativity, while the dimensions organizing this 
encounter were the cognitive controls of field dependence- 
independence, constricted-flexible, focusing-scanning, 
tolerance for ambiguity, equivalence range and leveling- 
sharpening. It was hypothesized that a) high creative ,Ss 
would be characterized, in the extreme, by the following 
cognitive controls: field independence, tolerance for 
ambiguity, and scanning; b) no distinction would be demon­
strated between high and low creative _Ss on the following 
cognitive controls: constricted-flexible, equivalence 
range and level ing-sharpening.
The sample consisted of 60 boys from the fifth 
grade of elementary school. They were administered three 
measures of intelligence and three of creativity, and eight 
tests for cognitive controls: Embedded Figures Test, Stroop 
Colour-Word Test, Object Sorting Test, Category Width Test, 
Schematizing Test and two tests designed by the author for 
focusing-scanning and tolerance for ambiguity. The S£ were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
divided into groups of 15 Ss. in regard to whether they were 
high and/or low on creativity and intelligence; the relation 
ship of each control to each group of Ss_ was then considered 
The hypotheses were confirmed in regard to the 
controls of focusing, constricted-flexible, and equivalence 
range. However, contrary to expectation, field independence 
and tolerance for ambiguity did not distinguish the high 
creative from the low creative S£. The results for level- 
in g-sharpen i n g were conflicting, but there was indications 
that the high creative Sts, tended to be sharpeners and the 
low creative Ss, levelers. The results were discussed in 
the light of Piaget's theoretical conceptions.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Subsuming all consideration of cognition and per­
ception is a basic epistemological problem - the relation­
ship between the knower and the known. Of vital relevance 
to this issue is the investigation of Individual consisten­
cies in cognitive behavior. The premise involved is that 
H the wide range of behaviors with which an individual 
encounters reality may be encompassed by relatively few 
dimensions of organization (Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, 
and Spence, 1959; p. 1).N This study is concerned with
a) the individual's encounter with his environment and b) 
the dimensions organizing this encounter. The theoretical 
perspective which will be adopted in order to encompass 
these two aspects is Piaget's conception of intelligence. 
This conception involves the functional invariants of 
adaptation and organization.
For the purposes of this study, adaptation will be 
considered to involve two basic modes - the intelligent and 
the creative. In operational terms, intelligence is defined 
as that behavior demonstrated on conventional IQ tests.
This definition is analogous to Guilford's conception of 
convergent thinking since this would appear to be the type
1
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of thinking required on conventional IQ tests. Likewise, 
creativity is defined in terns of an individual's responses 
to specific creativity tasks. Performance on these tasks 
would appear to necessitate what Guilford conceived of as 
divergent thinking. In order to elucidate theoretically 
these two modes of intercourse with one's environment, the 
following will be considered under adaptation: a) assim­
ilation and accommodation, b) autocentric and allocentric 
perception and c) creativity.
Empirically, this study is concerned with eluci­
dating the relationship between the intelligent and the 
creative modes of adaptation. Specifically, this study is 
concerned with investigating the dimensions by which an 
individual organizes his encounter with his environment 
in relation to these modes of adaptation. The dimensions 
of organization have been termed cognitive controls. The 
assumption is that these cognitive controls will correlate 
with consistent patterns of thinking and thus that they 
will be related differentially to intelligence and creativ­
ity. In this first chapter, adaptation and then organiz­
ation will be considered.
Adap tat ion 
Assimilation and Accommodation
The intellectual process is conceived of by Piaget 
as an active interaction between the organism and the envir­
onment. "This interaction functions outwardly as adaptive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3coping and inwardly as organization (Hunt, 1961; p. 111)." 
Adaptation and organization are thus conceived of as two 
complementary aspects of one process. Piaget sees adapt­
ation as involving the further functional invariants of 
assimilation and accommodation.
Assimilation here refers to the fact that 
every cognitive encounter with an environ­
mental object necessarily involves some 
kind of cognitive structuring (or restruct­
uring) of that object in accord with the
nature of the organism's existing intellect­
ual organization (Flavell, 1963; p. 48).
However, the knower must in some sense adapt himself to the
special properties of the object.
The essence of accommodation is precisely this 
process of adapting oneself to the variegated 
requirements or demands which the world of 
objects imposes on one (Flavell, 1963; p. 48).
These two processes are involved in all intellectual activ­
ity and intelligent adaptation to the environment is seen
as an equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation.
The equilibrium process thus involves bringing assimilation 
and accommodation into a balanced coordination. In a sense, 
assimilation and accommodation are always in a state of 
equilibrium, the crucial point is the degree of stability 
of this state. An unstable coordination is seen when one 
or other predominates as, for example, in imitation or play. 
Imitation is defined as the primacy of accommodation to 
external reality over assimilation, while play is termed 
the assimilation of external reality to pre-existing con­
cepts. From a theoretical point of view, it is Piaget's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
conception of play that is of particular Interest, for the
creative process is often interpreted in terms of play.
Piaget contends that
play manifests the peculiarity of a prim­
acy of assimilation over accommodation 
which permits it to transform reality in 
its own manner without submitting that 
transformation to the criterion of 
objective fact (Piaget, 1966; p. 111).
He then goes on to stress that play becomes more and more 
adequately adapted to nature. It is in this latter sense 
that he speaks of play as diminishing with age. The essen­
tial property of play, as Piaget defines it, is thus the 
deformation and subordination of reality to the desires of 
the self. The issue of play and assimilation will be 
returned to when creativity is considered.
Autocentric and Allocentric Perception
One of the most prevalent assumptions of beliefs 
of "everyman" is that what he perceives through his senses 
is true, that is, it is in point of fact Nrealityw . How­
ever, research carried out over the last several decades 
has demonstrated the complex, conflicting influences which 
determine not only "how* an individual perceives and under­
stands the objects of his environment but also **whatN he 
perceives. Considerable psychological energy has been 
invested in determining the conditions under which an 
individual more or less adequately relates to his environ­
ment. A perspective on this problem is Schachtel's (1959)
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conception of autocentric (subject-centered) and allocentric 
(object-centered) perception.
For Schachtel, autocentric and allocentric per­
ception are two basic modes of perception; he further dis­
tinguishes between primary and secondary autocentricity.
In primary autocentricity there is no objectification; the 
sensory quality and the feelings of the individual are fused. 
Although this mode predominates in the infant and the young 
child, it fades in importance or relevance as a mode of 
perception and consequently is not of concern here. Second­
ary autoeentrieity, however, is crucial to this discussion 
of intelligence and creativity. Secondary autocentricity 
essentially is perceiving the objects of one's environment 
from the perspective of society's demands on what should be 
perceived. What this means is that in an individual whose 
perception is predominantly secondary autocentric, the 
primary feature is not of the perception of an object as it 
is in its own right but what the individual needs to per­
ceive in terms of society's demands. The predominance of 
autocentric perception implies the slavish assimilation of 
percepts to fixed schemata, fixed perspectives of one's 
environment, and thus stifles any possibility for creative 
functioning. The point is that when secondary autocentric- 
ity predominates to the exclusion of allocentric perception,
the result is stereotyped thinking and creativity becomes 
impo ssi ble.
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Allocentric perception, on the other hand, in­
volves an openness toward the objects of one's environment.
the perceiver usually approaches or turns 
to the object actively and in doing so 
either opens himself toward it receptively, 
or figuratively or literally takes hold of 
it, tries to grasp it (Schachtel, 1959; p. 83).
From this, then, it is obvious that allocentric perception 
is necessary for the true encounter with objects which is 
vital to the creative process. This encounter with objects 
in allocentric perception appears to be Piaget's concept of 
accommodation. However, the creative process has been con­
ceived of by some (Taylor, 1959) as involving play, which 
suggests Piaget's concept of assimilation. Consequently, a 
theoretical delineation of creativity is warranted at this 
point.
Crea t ivi ty
Examination of the theoretical issues on creativ­
ity reveals two fundamental issues of primary concern. The 
first relates to the aforementioned discussion of play, that 
is, does the creative process involve a temporary suspension 
of logic in order to permit freer play of fantasy and imag­
ination or is it a direct result of logical reasoning. The 
second issue is whether creativity is the exclusive property 
of the select few or rather is it characteristic of man in 
general•
In regard to the first problem, the opposing 
positions might be typified by Taylor (1959) and Harris (1959)
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and perhaps also demonstrates the theoretical bias of the 
fields they represent. For Harris, a business executive 
concerned with creativity in marketing, the creative process 
is systematic and goal-directed with the only distinction 
between the genius and "everyman" being the speed with 
which the process is completed. For Taylor, a psychologist, 
"the rules of traditional logic are essentially a psycholog­
ical strai ght-jacket for creative thought (Taylor, 1959; 
p. 53)". To him, the vital aspect of creative insight is 
unconscious play.
Wallas (1926) first described the four basic 
stages of the creative process. These are essentially the 
same as Taylor's and it is the latter* s development which 
will be presented here. This delineation of creativity is 
adopted on the assumption that creativity is a function of 
individual differences in patterns of thinking and since 
individuals differ in these cognitive patterns, they will 
also differ in their ability to be creative. Taylor's four 
stages are exposure, incubation, illumination and execution.
During the exposure phase, the individual accumu­
lates an abundance of information from his environment.
The distinction between the creative and the non-creative 
individual during this stage is that the creative person is 
characterized by a "marked sensitivity to and voracious 
consumption of the environment which is most apparent in 
early years (Taylor, 1959; p. 62)". On the other hand, the 
non-creative individual quickly classifies all experiences
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in terms of preconceived stereotypes. The distinction also 
becomes apparent when individuals are looked at in relation 
to the continuum of tolerance-intoleranee for ambiguity.
The creative individual is able to tolerate ambiguous per­
ceptions of the world around him; the non-creative in­
dividual, however, only deals with those perceptions which 
are easy to understand or which do not cause conflict. The 
major point to be made for this stage is that if an individ­
ual is free not to incorporate all experience into pre­
determined structures, then there exists the possibility 
of a reorganization of the facts of experience which is 
the essence of creativity.
During the incubation phase, experiences are 
fluid enough that they do not become stereotyped, even 
though the creative person is aware of these stereotypes. 
Consequently if experiences are immediately stereotyped 
little incubation occurs.
The third or illumination phase is often referred 
to as the moment of insight, that is, when a new organiza­
tion is achieved, beyond the original facts or previous 
stereotypes. For the non-creative individual there is no 
insight into anything new since he is not able to escape 
previous categories and new experiences have essentially no 
impac t.
The final stage, execution, involves the commun­
ication of these subjective experiences into objective 
verbal or non-verbal forms. The manner in which they are
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communicated will largely determine and often modify the 
original insight. It is during this stage that many creative 
insights may be lost due to an individual's inability or 
even unwillingness to communicate his experiences in an 
objective form which is meaningful to others. It is the 
product then which permits some objective evaluation of the 
degree of creativity involved. In this context, Jackson 
and Messick (1965) discuss four characteristics of a creative 
product. They are unusualness, appropriateness, trans­
formation and condensation.
Unusualness refers to the infrequency of a response 
relative to norms and thereby provides a standard for making 
an evaluation of unusualness. However, unusualness is not 
sufficient as an evaluation of the creativeness of a product. 
It must also be distinguished from a product which is simply 
bizarre - hence the second characteristic of appropriateness. 
"It must make sense in the light of the demands of the 
situation and the desires of the producer (Jackson and 
Messick, 1965, p. 313).M Although a a product may possess 
the characteristic of unusualness and appropriateness, it 
may however vary considerably in the level of its quality 
as a creative product. However, a creative product must 
involve the transformation of material to overcome the 
constraints of conventional structures. The transformation 
power of the creative product is thus judged in the context 
of the constraints which it has to overcome. Creativity 
thus involves more than just improvements of pre-existing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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forms; it means the production of new forms. In Jackson
and Messick's view, the fourth criterion of a creative
product is that of condensation. In their words:
The condensation achieved by a creative 
product summarizes essences, and the summary 
may be expanded and interpreted in a multi­
plicity of ways - intellectually and affect­
ively, in terms of image or idea. It may be 
interpreted differently by different viewers 
or by the same viewer on difference occasions. 
This multiplicity of interpretation and the 
extensiveness of the expansions generated by 
the condensation are an indication of its 
summary power, and an appraisal of summary 
power provides an important judgmental 
standard for the evaluation of creative 
condensation (Jackson & Messick, 1965; p. 320).
There are thus two ways, at least, of looking at 
creativity - from the point of view of process or in terms 
of products. Obviously, creativity as a process can not be 
observed directly but only inferred. However, light can be 
shed on the process if it can be demonstrated that creative 
Ss differ consistently from non-creative Sjs in terms of 
cognitive controls. The implication or hypothetical 
assumption being adopted here is thus that individuals 
differing in terms of creativity will also demonstrate 
corresponding and consistent differences in cognitive con­
trols. On the other side, the possibility of assessing 
creativity in terms of products can be provided through 
tests designed specifically to provide an opportunity for 
creative expression which can then be evaluated.
The above conception of the creative process can 
be integrated into the conceptual model adopted here.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Creativity could be viewed as involving a preponderance (at 
least in the initial stages) of assimilation, in a fashion 
analogous to Piaget's delineation of play. Perhaps this 
conception of creative play can be made more explicit if it 
is considered in the light of the following: Kris' notion 
of "regression in the service of the ego" (Kris, 1952); and
b) Guilford's concept of "divergent thinking" (Guilford, 
1956).
For Kris, the ability to relax ego function 
(regression) is central to creativity. What this means is 
that when an unconscious idea rises to consciousness, the 
ego suspends its censoring function mementarily, this in­
volves a "disregard of external stringencies (Kris, 1952 ; 
p. 253)". The regard for external stringencies (normal ego 
function) is similar to accommodation in Piaget's system 
and also Schachtel's secondary autocentricity.
What divergent thinking involves for Guilford is 
the freedom to change direction of thinking.
In convergent thinking there is usually 
one conclusion or answer that is regarded 
as unique, and thinking is channeled or 
controlled in the light of that answer.
In divergent thinking, on the other hand, 
there is much searching, or going off in 
various directions (Guilford, 1956; p. 289).
What these two perspectives elaborate is basic distinctions
between the non-creative and the creative individual. In
the present conception, then, they delineate an individual
who is able to play with his environment - who is not tied
to conventional stereotyped lines of thought. However, as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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stated earlier, what distinguishes the true creative product 
from phantasy is that it must be appropriate, in other words, 
it must involve some accommodation to the demands of "real­
ity", which involves ego control. In Kris' view, the ego 
regression is only temporary; "one controlled by the ego 
which retains the function of establishing contact with the 
audience (Kris, 1952 ; p. 167)". This quotation suggests 
that creativity can be more fruitfully conceived of as a 
process involving both assimilation and accommodation. 
Creative individuals would at times be able to ignore con­
ventional lines of thought and previous structures and then 
at other times be acutely aware of external objects. Thus 
the creative person is coneived of as an individual who in 
his cognitive functioning is able to move freely between 
assimilation and accommodation in the course of his adapta­
tion with his environment. Finally Piaget states that the 
complement of adaptation is organization; creativity is 
distinguished from the ordinary intellectual process in 
that it involves a reorganization of the facts of experience 
into new schemata.
A theoretical perspective of intelligence and 
creativity has been presented, but their interrelationship 
needs to be made explicit. The perspective adopted here 
implies that conventional intelligence and creativity are 
distinct modes of thought. However, another feasible 
position is that creativity is based upon a general intelli­
gence factor.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The position which appears to be becoming in­
creasingly popular in some circles is that creativity is 
a separate aspect o£ intellectual functioning from "intelli- 
genceN , defined as a score on a conventional IQ test. It 
has been contended that the creative aspect of intellectual 
functioning is not tapped by conventional tests (Guilford, 
1950; Getzels & Jackson, 1962; and Torrance, 1963). Sigel
(1963) describes conventional evaluations of intelligence 
as assessing only "the ability to see things as organized
in conventional classes or units". Also there is the afore­
mentioned distinction of Guilford (1959) between convergent 
and divergent thinking. However, several writers have 
questioned whether creativity is a distinct dimension. In 
support of this position is the fact that several studies 
have reported significant correlations between creativity 
and conventional intelligence. Richards, Cline and Needham 
(1954) obtained correlations between measures of intelli­
gence and creativity which ranged between .20 and .41, 
while in the Meer and Stein study (1955), the range was 
between .06 and .54. Similarly, Thorndike (1963) and Marsh
(1964) both factored the correlation table reported by 
Getzels and Jackson (1962, p. 20), but failed to obtain a 
highly loaded factor for creativity which was not substan­
tially loaded by conventional intelligence tests.
Part of this disagreement is undoubtedly account­
ed for by the questionable validity of creativity measures,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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particularly since what is involved is value judgments on 
which responses fit some criteria (Maltzman, 1960; Mednick, 
1962; Taylor, 1964; Jackson & Messick, 1965). In addition, 
Wodtke (1964) has shown that creativity tests have low 
reliabilities. In an attempt to clarify this issue, Cropley
(1965) carried out a factor analytic study employing six 
convergent tests and seven divergent tests. The results he 
obtained were two large factors defined by the convergent 
tests and the divergent tests, respectively. The factor 
matrix was orthogonally rotated and 81 percent of the vari­
ance of the first factor was defined by two IQ measures and 
academic average. However, although 85 percent of the vari­
ance of the second factor was accounted for by five crea­
tivity measures, 12.3 percent of its variance was defined 
by the previous three scores. Although oblique rotations 
reduced the loadings of the tests involving convergent pro­
cesses, they still demonstrated that the second factor was 
partially dependent on convergent processes. Cropley in- 
terpretes the findings as supporting the notion that "con­
ventional skills may provide the basis upon which creative 
productions rest (Cropley, 1966; p. 264)".
Wallach and Kogan (1965) adopt a view which is a 
cogent argument in favour of the position that there is a 
distinction between the intelligent and creative modes of 
cognitive functioning. They criticized previous studies 
such as those of Torrance and his associates and the
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Guilford group on the grounds that imposing explicit or 
implicit time limits and a test-like atmosphere mediates 
against creative functioning, and the correlations report­
ed simply indicate that the creativity measures employed 
to date are not appropriate, for the reason just indicated. 
This position also finds indirect support from the reported 
reliabilities of Wallach and Kogan (1965). Two of their 
creativity measures yielded correlations of .51 and .75, 
however all other correlations were between .87 and .93. 
Wodtke (1964) investigated the reliabilities of the Torrance 
test batteries, by test-retest with a two month interval.
For the non-verbal creativity tests, the total score cor­
relations (among children in grade five) ranged between .05 
and .59, with a total non-verbal correlation of .64. For 
the verbal creativity tests, the total score correlations 
ranged between .43 and .66. The total verbal score correla­
tion was .73 and the total creativity score correlation was 
.75. He also investigated the reliabilities for grades two, 
three and four; the reliabilities for these grades were 
generally lower than just outlined for grade five. The 
author points out that the low reliabilities were not a 
function of low interscorer agreement where the correlations 
ranged from .95 to .99 for total battery scores. Wodtke 
also correlated the creativity scores with the Lorge- 
Thorndike Group Intelligence test. For the total creativity 
score and the intelligence scores, the correlations ranged
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between .36 and .46. This data would appear to lend support 
to the position of Wallach and Kogan (1965), however, the 
controversy is still far from settled and awaits more 
extensive investigation.
Piaget's concept of adaptation has been taken to 
be the theoretical construct encompassing all cognitive 
activity of which measures of intelligence and creativity 
delineate two major dimensions. This model also encompasses 
cognitive controls since they are the regulative functions 
organizing an individual's intercourse with the environ­
ment.
Organization 
Adaptation, in relation to cognitive activity, 
expresses the manner in which an individual copes with his 
environment. However "every act of intelligence presumes 
some kind of intellectual structure, some sort of organiza­
tion, within which it precedes (Flavell, 1963; p. 46)*'. As 
stated initially, the assumption adopted is that there is a 
wide range of behavior which can be encompassed by a few 
dimensions of organization, namely, cognitive controls. 
Cognitive controls are
... conceived of as slow-changing develop- 
mentally stabilized structures: a) they are 
relatively invariant over a given class of 
situations and intentions; b) they are opera­
tive despite the shifts in situational and 
behavioral contexts typical of cognitive 
activity from moment to moment (Gardner e_t 
al_., 1959; p. 5).
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Investigations of these controls have been carried out by 
Klein, Gardner, Holzman and their associates, centered at 
the Menninger clinic. The controls which they have deline­
ated (some of which are given bi-polar names) are the 
following: constricted-flexible (Smith & Klein, 1953); 
scanning or focusing (Schl esin ger, 1954); equivalence range 
(Gardner, 1953); tolerance for unrealistic experiences 
(Klein & Schlesinger, 1951); and 1eveling-sharpening (Klein 
& Holzman, 1950). Another cognitive control which will be 
dealt with in this study is that of field dependence- 
independence (Witkin, Lewis, Hertzman, Machover, Meissner, 
and Wapner, 1954).
In the view of Gardner and his associates, these 
controls become relatively autonomous during development 
and are shaped by both constitutional and experiental fac­
tors.
... they represent certain broad areas of ego 
organi zation tha t seem to be important to the 
individual's efforts to achieve his own part­
icular style of adaptive organization to his 
world (Gardner, 1962; p. 185).
Studies carried out chiefly by the Menninger group have 
demonstrated that, in relation to each control and the 
specific tests purported to measure these controls, individ­
uals differ consistently in these aspects of cognitive con­
trol. Each of these controls will be defined in turn.
Field dependence-independence encompasses an in­
dividual's ability to overcome the influence of the sur­
rounding field or to separate an item from its context.
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Witkin et_ al. (1962 ) state that people generally ranged on 
a continuum from field dependent to field independent. Those 
Ss toward the field dependent end of the continuum are 
characterized by a) general passivity in dealing with the 
environment, b) lack of self-awareness, and low self-esteem; 
whereas field independent are characterized by a) activity 
in dealing with the environment, b) awareness of "inner life" 
and c) high self-esteem.
Constricted-Flexible Control delineates modes of 
reacting to contradictory and intrusive cues. When dealing 
with distracting stimuli, constricted S_s respond to the 
most dominant cues in the field and ignore the others. 
Flexible Ss, on the other hand, are most comfortable in 
situations involving contradictory cues and are able to 
ignore the most dominant stimulus if it is inappropriate.
Focusing-Scanning refers to the extent of attent­
ion deployment. The individual at the focusing end of the 
continuum constantly scans the stimulus field and is thus 
aware of relatively many aspects of the field, while the 
scanner is more restricted in his attention deployment.
Equivalence Range is concerned with individual 
differences in categorizing stimuli. Narrow equivalence 
range delineates the relative tendency to use many categor­
ies while in broad equivalence range, there is the tendency 
to use few all-inclusive categories or groupings.
Tolerance for Unrealistic Experiences concerns
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an individual's willingness to accept perception at variance 
with conventional experience.
Level in g-Sharpenin g is concerned with modes of 
organizing a sequence of stimuli characterized by either 
a low level of articulation of new stimuli (leveling) or 
a high level of articulation (sharpening).
Concerning the genesis of these controls, the 
view taken is that they are shaped by both constitutional 
and experiential factors. To date no investigators have 
demonstrated that these controls have antecedants in par­
ticular life experiences and/or specific genetic factors 
as such. However, there are indications as to the develop­
mental sequence, and some studies employing brain-damaged 
Ss have suggested, in part, the role of constitutional 
f ac tors.
In regard to development, Witkin e_t al_. (1962) 
have indicated that the normal course of development is 
from field dependent to more field independent. The develop­
ment of this control and constricted-flexible have been 
explained in terms of Werner's organismic-developmental 
theory, with its emphasis on the increase of perceptual 
and cognitive differentiation with increasing maturity 
(Witkin e_t a_l_., 1962 ; Comraalli, Wapner, and Werner, 1962). 
Similarly, Santotefano and Paley (1964) suggested that the 
scanning end of the focusing-scanning continuum and con­
stricted control are developmental 1y earlier since they
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characterized the cognitive functioning of the youngest 
children. In regard to tolerance for unrealistic exper­
iences (tolerance for ambiguity) Frenke1-Brunswick*s (1949) 
delineation appears to attribute its development solely to 
experiential factors.
Three of the controls (field dependence-independ- 
ence, focusing-scanning, and 1eveling-sharpening) have at 
least some major component of attention, the major dimens­
ions of which might be delineated as a) momentary attention 
span, b) selective attention, c) sustained attention, and 
d) extensiveness of attention deployment (Gardner, 1966).
In regard to momentary attention span, it is generally 
more limited in children than in adults and is severely 
limited in the brain-damaged individual. Impairment of 
selective attention is one of the most serious handicaps 
for the brain-damaged since an individual is unable to 
distinguish the essential from the non-essential. These 
individuals would be expected to be field dependent.
Gardner (1964) suggests that the Embedded Figures Test(a 
measure of field dependence-independence) can be used as 
a criterion measure for selectiveness of attention. In 
regard to sustained attention, a defect in this aspect is 
rather widespread among the brain-damaged. The relation­
ship extensiveness of attention deployment to cognitive 
controls is more directly evident. Gardner (1964) points 
out the great individual variations in extensiveness of 
focusin g-scannin g that people engage in before making
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decisions about stimuli. Gardner (1966) suggests that the 
degree of focusing-scanning in children may be effected 
by the impulsivity of children in general and the still 
greater impulsivity so often characteristic of the brain­
damaged child. The cognitive controls have been character­
ized as modes of intercourse with one's environment, but 
it is clear from the above that attention plays an import­
ant role in this intercourse and short-circuiting of attent­
ion can only reduce the clarity of experience.
The relevant research on each of the cognitive 
controls will be considered in turn.
Field Dependence-lndependence
Witkin (1950) reported a study on "Individual 
Differences in Ease of Perceptions of Embedded Figures", 
in which he demonstrated that individuals differ reliably 
in their ability to extract an item from the field in which 
it appears. The criterion measure involved was the Embedded 
Figures Test (EFT), a set of drawings which Witkin adapted 
from the Gottschaldt figures. Witkin ejt al_. (1954) report­
ed individual differences in mode of orientation in that 
ti1 ting-room-ti1ting-chair (TRTC) and the rod-and-frame 
(RFT) test. These various tests, but especially the EFT, 
have come to define a dimension of cognitive control which 
Witkin and his associates first termed field dependence- 
independence. In general, it seems to apply to situations 
that contain competing sets of cues, perceived by the j5.
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The term field independent was applied to those who 
showed a ready capacity to differentiate objects from their 
backgrounds. On the other end of the continuum, field 
dependent Ss were those who demonstrated a realatively 
passive submission to the domination of the background, and 
were unable to keep an item separate from its context.
Witkin (1960) reported the finding that "children tend to 
be field dependent early in their perceptual development and 
to become more field independent as they grow up." In re­
gard to specific individuals, the findings were that a 
child who was relatively field independent at one age 
would show the same tendency at later ages. Individuals 
were also consistent across tests, i.e., a child who was 
field dependent on the EFT was apt also to be field depend­
ent on the RFT and TRTC. Goodenough and Karp (1961), in 
their factorial study, obtained a factor which was loaded 
by correlations from three subtests on the WISC (block 
design, picture arrangement, and object assembly) and the 
EFT. This was interpreted by the authors as tending to
support the Witkin hypothesis that relation­
ships obtained in many studies between tests 
of field dependence and standard tests of 
intelligence stem, at least in part, from 
common requirements shared by measures of 
field dependence and of certain kinds of 
intellectual abilities (Goodenough & Karp,
1961; p. 245).
Witkin and his associates have broadened the 
concept of field dependence-independence. This concept 
grew out of the specific perceptual test already mentioned.
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The authors, however, felt that styles of functioning tapped 
by these tests extend to intellectual functioning as well; 
they gathered convincing evidence to support the general 
applicability of this concept (Witkin et, al_. , 1962). The 
terras that Witkin et_ al_. (1962) have adopted to dichotomize 
cognitive functioning are those of global versus analytic. 
Thus, according to Faterson (1962), "for the relatively field 
dependent Ss, object and field tend to 'fuse', so that the 
separation called for by the task cannot easily be made".
The field dependent Ss1 cognitive functioning is thus said 
to be global. On the other hand, the field independent :S 
can keep object and field separate and consequently his 
functioning is said to be analytic.
Klein, Gardner and their associates have also 
investigated field dependence-independence, employing Witkin's 
criterion tests - EFT and RFT. They have, however, felt that 
there are certain similarities between field dependence and 
constricted-flexible control. On the basis of their results, 
Gardner et_ al_. (1959) include both dimensions under the 
concept of field articulation. However, a subsequent study 
(Gardner et_ <al_. , 1960) failed to confirm the findings that 
they both load the same factor. Apparently, they have not 
revamped their interpretation on this point. Gardner (1962) 
obtained a factor which he labelled field articulation, how­
ever the correlations it included were from the EFT and RFT 
only and not from the measure for constricted-flexible cont­
rol.
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Gardner and Long (1961) found that the speed with 
which persons identify embedded figures is significantly 
related to the number of items correct in recall (word 
lists) under conditions of interference despite the admin­
istration of the Word Recall Test three years after the 
EFT. Employing Thurstone's Concealed Figures Test, as a 
criterion test for field articulation, Long (1962) found 
that S_£ who had great difficulty finding the embedded fig­
ures learned or relearned more slowly and were less accur­
ate on recall. Ss_ who could easily locate hidden figures 
were significantly superior on all learning and recall 
tasks. From the preceding, it can be seen that the field 
dependence-independence control principle has important 
implications for cognitive behavior.
Constricted-Flexible
In regard to the constricted-flexible control
principle, the criterion measure that is most often employed
is the Stroop Colour-Word Test (Stroop, 1936b). Over the
last thirty years, considerable research has been carried
out employing this test. In an extensive review of research
dealing with the test to date, Jensen and Rohwer (1966)
concluded that
a) it yields highly reliable and stable 
measures of individual differences on what 
seems to be three quite simple and basic 
aspects of human performance; b) though 
there are reliable individual differences 
on each of the three time scores obtained 
from the Stroop test, the three scores
maintain the same rank order of magnitude
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for all £s (there was no single exception 
among over 400 Ss_ tested by the writers 
(Jensen & Rohwer, 1966; p. 36).
The Stroop test has been employed extensively in 
studies of cognitive behavior. It has been employed to 
delineate two types of cognitive behavior - a) sensori­
motor versus conceptual dominance and b) automatization or 
constricted-flexible control. It has also been used to 
delineate types of individuals who differ in patterns of 
cognitive behavior - cumulatives, disassociatives and 
stabilizers.
The dimension of sensorimotor vs. conceptual dom­
inance was defined by Broverman and Lazarus (1958). It is 
specified by the speed with which Ss can read the names of 
colours (W) vs. the colours (C) themselves. Those Ss_ who 
have a high C/W ratio were designated as sensorimotor dom­
inant. Subjects were then said to have a stronger cognitive 
subsystem in the dominant aspect.
Broverman and Lazarus' basic premise was the 
cognitive subsystems have an inherent tendency to maintain 
their organizations. From this they derived the following 
two hypotheses:
a) the stronger the tendency of a cognitive 
subsystem to maintain its organization, the 
less vulnerable to distraction are task per­
formances involving that subsystem; and b) 
when two cognitive subsystems compete, the 
stronger subsystem tends to dominate cogni­
tion such that the £  tends to emphasize 
cognitive operations^ associated with that 
subsystem (Broverman & Lazarus, 1958; p. 103).
After categorizing S_s in terms of cognitive dominance, they
177155
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were then given conceptual and sensorimotor tasks under 
neutral and interference conditions. The results obtained 
were that interference effects impaired performance less 
when the task involved the stronger cognitive system. Also, 
under interference, the Ss tended more to be oriented to­
wards cognitive operations which were associated with the 
stronger cognitive subsystems.
The second dimension is automatization and con­
stricted-flexible cognitive control. Automatization is the 
term employed by Broverman (1960a) for the tendency of 
certain acts to become automatic and require little conscious 
effort or attention. This concept is defined by the same 
Stroop scores as Klein (1954) and his associates' concept of 
constricted-flexible control and thus Broverman's studies 
provide independent evidence for this control.
Klein (1954) employed the Stroop in an investigat­
ion of need, but reference will be made to this study only 
as it demonstrates the cognitive control of constricted- 
flexible. He used the Stroop to define two extreme groups 
on interference-proneness. The technique employed was a 
standard usage of the test, i.e., Ss^  were required to read 
aloud the colours red, green, yellow, and blue which were 
printed in incongruent colour names. For example, if the 
word r-e-d appeared in blue ink, the S^ was required to read 
"blue". As is consistent with all the previous research, 
there were individual differences in terms of susceptibility 
to interference. Of particular interest here is the
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differential performance of these Ss on another cognitive 
task. The test procedure which Klein (1954) investigated 
was size estimations.
In the size estimation task, the S_s are required 
to make judgments under two conditions - perception and 
memory. In the perceptual task, the J3 was required to 
adjust a variable circle of light until it appeared equal 
in size to a standard disc. The result of relevance here 
is that the two groups separated distinctly in the direction 
of error: the high-interference group markedly underestimat­
ed while the low-interference group overestimated the size 
of the variable circle of light in comparison with the 
standard. Also, the hi gh-interf erence S>£ performed with 
greater individual consistency than did the 1ow-interfer­
ence Ss. In the second condition (memory), both groups 
tended to overestimate, but the overestimation was sign­
ificantly greater in the 1ow-interference group. In re­
viewing the data on these two tests, Klein suggests that 
the constricted control Ss_ (those with a high interference 
score - CW) more thoroughly traversed the whole range of 
possible settings before coming to a decision. This group 
also had less individual variability. He concluded that 
th i s
all seemed to point to a tightened or 
suppressive form of control, reflecting, 
perhaps determined efforts to keep judg­
ments in line with whatever external 
sources of information, cues and anchors 
were available in the stimulus field 
(Klein, 1954).
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The use of the term 'constricted' by Klein suggests 
that this mode of the control is detrimental - the less 
effective end of the continuum. However, if the creative 
process is conceived of as involving accommodation, then the 
creative individual could be expected at times to demonstrate 
constricted control - 'efforts to keep judgments in line 
with external sources of information'. This, then, is the 
theoretical conception of constricted-flexible control. The 
problem thus becomes to delineate operationally this control 
as it relates to cognitive behavior.
Loomis and Maskowitz (1958) investigated one feat­
ure of the constricted-flexible distinction suggested by 
Klein's work (1954); i.e., that the flexible and constricted 
attitudes would likely involve different ways of tolerating 
ambiguity. From their study, they concluded that when a 
stimulus contained competing, overlapping, contradictory 
elements, the flexibles would tend to integrate these 
elements, whereas the constrictors were more likely to keep 
the intrusive ambiguities separated as much as possible. 
Gardner and Long (1960e), in their test-retest, study, 
obtained a Pearson's £  of .55 (p<.001) for the interfer­
ence group.
Broverman defines cognitive style as "manifesta­
tions of different response probabilities or response streng­
ths in certain types or classes of behavior (Broverman, 1960a; 
p. 167)". He investigated "cognitive style" as it relates 
to two different types of tasks, the first being situations
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in which the task was novel, difficult or concentration- 
demanding. The second was one that was practiced to the 
point of being automatic. The previously discussed "concept­
ual versus" perceptual motor dominance" applies to the 
former, while "automatization" applies to the latter. All 
Ss were categorized as to which end of the continuum they 
fell on each of the two dimensions - conceptual vs. per­
ceptual motor dominance and automatization. Four groups 
resulted; Sj. who are
1) conceptual dominant (CD) & strong automatizers (SA)
2) conceptual dominant (CD) & weak automatizers (UA)
3) perceptual motor dominant (PMD) & strong automatizers (SA)
4) perceptual motor dominant (PMD) & weak automatizers (WA)
As predicted, the CD S_s were less impaired than the PMD Sjs 
on the concentration-demanding conceptual task, with the 
reverse being true on the concentration-demanding perceptual 
motor task. On the automatic tasks, there was no significant 
differences between these Ss_. Similarly, on the automatic 
task, there was less interference on the task relevant
to the stronger cognitive style, however in this case the 
F test only reached the .08 level of significance. There 
was also no significant difference between SA and WA on the 
concentration-demanding tasks. Broverman's work is especially 
relevant since the work of Klein and his associates was gen­
erally on neutral tasks. Broverman, on the other hand, employ­
ed tasks which were carried out under distracting, interfer­
ing conditions, thus providing support for the more general
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applicability of cognitive controls to behavior.
Focusin g-Scanning
Schlesinger first proposed this cognitive control 
under the label of Focusing (Schlesinger, 1954). He defined 
it in the following manner: H ... an underlying preference 
for experiencing the world in a narrow discriminating way, 
even when the task does not demand such an approach 
(Schlesinger, 1954; p. 356)." This conception of focusing, 
however, appears to have something in common with the 
cognitive control of tolerance for unrealistic experiences 
since he defines the opposite end of the continuum as 
including individuals who Mwould be less intent upon check­
ing their inner experiences against some objective standard 
and would be more prone to accept them uncritically 
(Schlesinger, 1954; p. 356)". Adopting this as the basic 
dichotomy, he then administered tasks (size estimation and 
picture sorting) which he hypothesized would discriminate 
Ss on this control. The results obtained were in the 
predicted direction: i.e., those who performed well on the 
size-estimation task, performed poorly on a task which was 
antithetical to it, i.e., picture sorting. In a later study, 
which employed the size estimation test, Holzman (1957) 
concluded that "focusers experience not only foveal objects 
with greater vividness but they are simultaneously actively 
aware of many more incidental aspects of a field than non- 
focusers (Holzman, 1957; p. 388)". This lends support for
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the hypothesis that this principle is a mode of reality 
contac t.
In his discussion of some process components of
the cognitive controls, Klein (1958) stated that
A cognitive attitude which we now call 
'scanning' ... shows a distinctive quality 
of attention deployment. In the scanning 
attitude, attention is broadly and 
intensively deployed. The scanner is 
aware of a broad array of background 
qualities of a stimulus field. His 
investment is intensively incorporative , 
characterized by a constant, close 
look (Klein, 1958; p. 88).
A further study by Gardner and Lohrenz (1961) 
provides support for this notion that the degree of atten­
tion to stimuli affects the amount of their mutual assimi­
lation. They concluded that when an individual fixes his 
attention on stimuli, the percepts become so stabilized 
that "they are less susceptible to interaction with memor­
ies of related earlier experiences in the course of memory 
formation (Gardner & Lohrenz, 1961; p. 611)".
Gardner and Long (1962a) investigated individual 
differences in scanning behavior in a variety of size esti­
mation tasks (one of the criterion tasks for this principle) 
and on the Rorschach. They found that the main difference 
between scanners and non-scanners appears to be in the 
amount of information that the individual demands from the 
environment before making a response. The individual who 
scans his environment extensively appears to be more con­
cerned with making a right response, one that will be
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accepted by others. An individual who engages in limited 
scanning appears more relaxed and less critical in his 
acceptance of his personal experiences.
Santotefano and Paley (1964) conducted a develop­
mental study of scanning; they also employed a size estimat­
ion task. Their results suggested that scanning, defined as 
the deployment of attention in an unsystematic, disorderly 
manner, is the more rudimentary form of cognitive function­
ing on this control, since it characterized the functioning 
of the younger children.
In this study, the opposing ends of the continuum 
this control will be delineated as focusing and scanning, 
respectively. Focusers are those who deploy attention 
systematically and in an orderly fashion, whereas scanners 
deploy attention unsystematically. Focusers thus inspect 
the information contained in the stimulus field more effic­
iently than scanners.
Equivalence Range
In regard to the cognitive behavior circumscribed 
by this control principle, there are two general "approach- 
es" to the problem. One is encompassed by the concept of 
category width, and the other is equivalence range. Whether 
the two are synonomous or not is unanswerable to date since 
the evidence is equivocal. However, each area will be 
delineated in turn.
The concept of equivalence range was first
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proposed by Gardner (1953). Subjects were tested on five 
tasks, one an object sorting task and four tasks involving 
constancy and brightness judgments. The expectation was 
that their performances would reflect consistent individual 
differences in equivalence ranges. The results obtained 
supported this general hypothesis. At the extremes of the 
dimension, some _Ss divided an assortment of objects into 
as many as 30 groups, while others had only four groups. 
Similarly, persons of narrow equivalence range were also 
more accurate on object matches in size-constancy tasks.
This result was confirmed only for women in a further study 
(Gardner ejt a_l_. , 1959). Sloane (1959) demonstrated that 
this control principle is in evidence in a wide variety of 
categorizing tasks. A study by Clayton and Jackson (1961) 
suggested that broad equivalence range may be associated 
with over general i za t ion. Also, Gardner and Long's study 
(1960e) on the stability of cognitive controls yielded a 
test-retest jr of .75 for the object sorting test. Finally, 
Gardner and Schoen (1962) and Sloane, Garlow and Jackson 
(1962) have shown that equivalence range behavior is highly 
consistent across a variety of stimulus domains.
Turning to category width, Bruner and Rodriquez 
(1956) initially demonstrated that jSjs reveal marked individ­
ual consistency in the range or width of their categories. 
Pettigrew (1958) composed a Ca te gory-Wi dth scale (C-W) 
which correlated +.57 (p<T.01) with Bruner and Rodriquez's 
laboratory procedures. He concludes that his findings support
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the interpretation that an individual's category width 
is his typical equivalence range for classifying objects.
He also argues that category width also taps a "risk-taking" 
dimension, that broad categorizers are those who are willing 
to accept Type I errors and tolerate negative instances. 
Wallach and Caron (1959), Bruner and Tajfel (1961) and 
Tajfel, Richardson and Everstine (1964) all developed lab­
oratory procedures which required the Ss_ to make judgments 
of the number of instances which would be admitted to a 
particular class of stimuli. In these studies, narrow 
categorizers were reflected by their higher rejection rates 
for categories, whereas broad categorizers had high rates 
of acceptance. Bruner and Tajfel (1961) also found that 
narrow categorizers tended to be more sensitive to change 
in the stimulus environment. The C-W test (Pettigrew, 1958) 
correlated positively with the Wallach and Caron (1959) pro­
cedure in the latter's study.
In regard to the possible interrelationships 
between these two concepts - category width and equivalence 
range, as mentioned earlier, the evidence is equivocal.. 
Sloane, Garlow and Jackson (1963) reported that the two are 
independent of each other. Those Ss^  who are broad in equi­
valence range on object sorting tasks (where categories 
derive from the £) do not necessarily also achieve broad 
band width scores on categorizing tasks (in which the cat­
egories are inherent in the tasks). On the other hand, 
Gardner and Schoen (1962), in their factorial study, obtained
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a strong factor which was heavily loaded with correlations 
from tests purported to measure, independently, equivalence 
range and category width.
Tolerance for Unrealistic Experiences
The Menninger group's work on this control prin­
ciple began with a study by Klein and Schlesinger (1951) 
on perceptual attitudes toward instability. These attitudes 
were experimentally defined by Rorschach responses and in 
the experience of apparent movement; these attitudes were 
resistance and tolerance for instability. Their hypothesis 
was that "one expression of this attitude is the degree to 
which 'reality testing' rigidly requires the holding on to 
forms as they are known to be, refusing to tamper with real­
ity as given (Klein & Schlesinger, 1951; p. 301)". Subjects 
were apportioned, from Rorschach test scores, into two 
groups (form-labile and form-bound). The result obtained 
was that the groups differed significantly in qualitative 
and quantitative responses to the apparent movement test, 
with the range being restricted in the form-bound group.
Also, the general attitudes of ease of projection on the 
one hand and reluctance to do so on the other were quite 
evident. Klein, Gardner and Schlesinger (1962) conducted 
a study in which many measures, which they felt were indica­
tive of tolerance for unrealistic experiences, were factor- 
analyzed. Three factors resulted which accounted for 517. 
of the variance. The first factor (21% of the variance)
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they interpreted in terras of tolerance for experiences that 
are at variance with conventional reality. The second factor 
(167. of the variance) they interpreted as representing level- 
ing-sharpening, while the third represented responses to a 
specific test.
Other investigators have been carrying out re­
search under the label of "tolerance for ambiguity". This 
concept has been defined as Ma tendency to resort to black- 
white solutions, to arrive at premature closure as to val- 
uative aspects, often at the neglect of reality (Frenkel- 
Brunswick, 1949; p. 115)". The research under "tolerance 
for ambiguity" is concerned with an individual's response 
to stimulus ambiguity, while the research labelled "toler­
ance for unrealistic experiences” appears to be concerned 
with situational ambiguity. It can be hypothesized that 
unrealistic experiences is a special case of stimulus am­
biguity. However, this relationship awaits further theor­
etical elaboration and investigation.
Tasks designed to measure intolerance for ambi­
guity have been mostly of the figure recognition variety. 
There are two types; the first usually consists of a set of 
cards (or slots with a pull-tab). The first card of the 
series has only a few elements of a design and successive 
cards have more and more elements, culminating in the final 
card with the complete design (Levitt, 1953; Smock, 1955). 
This technique has been termed the Decision Location Test 
(Levitt, 1953). Another technique, employed by Draguns and
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Multari (1961) was to photograph a drawing with the objective 
moved successively out of focus.
Some studies have attempted to amplify the notion 
of intolerance for ambiguity by investigating a) the response 
characteristics of ethnocentric as compared to non-ethnocent- 
ric S_£; and b) its relationship to the experience of anxiety. 
The rational for the former was Frenkel-Brunswick' s suggest­
ion that intolerance for ambiguity is the crucial variable 
in the ethnocentric personality. A number of studies (Block 
& Block, 1951; Brown, 1953; Levitt, 1953; O'Connor, 1952; and 
Rokeach, 1948) have supported this notion. In regard to the 
second line of research, it has been postulated theoretically 
that "intolerance for ambiguity arises from the emotional 
conflict and intensity of anxiety experienced during the 
socialization process (Smock, 1957; p. 27)". There is 
little direct support for this; however, Smock in his studies 
has provided indirect support by demonstrating a relationship 
between experimentally induced anxiety and intolerance for 
ambiguity (Smock, 1955a, & b).
The research referred to above is more personal­
ity oriented and is tangential to the primary concern here, 
i.e., tolerance for ambiguity as a stable characteristic of 
an individual's cognitive behavior. More directly related 
to the present study is that of Loomis and Moskowitz (1958). 
They investigated the relationship between stimulus ambiguity 
and flexible-constricted control; they concluded that the
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latter control appears to be more meaningful than the 
dimension of tolerance for ambiguity in differentiating 
individuals' responses to ambiguity.
On the assumption that an individual's response 
to stimulus ambiguity has more generality than "tolerance 
for unrealistic experiences", this study will be concerned 
with the former. More specifically, tolerance-intolerance 
for ambiguity is defined in terms of an individual's tend­
ency to reach premature closure.
The _S' s choice is then between extending 
the exploration of the picture - i.e., to 
use Piaget's terms, accommodating himself 
to its emerging properties - or cutting this 
search short by assimilating the percept to 
the objects of his previous experience 
(Draguns & Multari, 1961; p. 548).
Leveling-Sharpening
The 1eveling-sharpening control principle and its 
criterion test, the Schematizing test, were first presented 
by Holzman and Klein (1951). They postulated that "one 
basis for understanding these differences (individual diff­
erences in response to changing stimuli) was through per­
ceptual attitudes of 'leveling' and 'assimilation' or of 
•differentiation* and 'contrast' (Holzman & Klein, 1951; 
p. 257)". On the basis of their study, they concluded that 
these perceptual attitudes would be stable within individ­
uals and would be predictive of personality tendencies.
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Sharpening refers to a propensity to maximize 
stimulus differences, an attunement to small 
gradients of difference between figure and 
ground. People who level tend to minimize 
such differences and to prefer the experience 
of sameness to that of difference (Holzman,
1954; p. 376).
Many additional studies were carried out on the 
relevance of 1eveiing-sharpening to other aspects of behav­
ior. In a study of serial behavior patterns, Smith & Klein 
(1953) also employed the Schematizing test. In point of 
fact, they were investigating the relationship of leveling- 
sharpening to constricted-flexible control, since the mea­
sures of serial behavior patterns were obtained from the 
Stroop Colour-Word Test. They distinguished three types of 
individuals on the basis of their performance on the Stroop. 
The scoring procedure consistent of measuring an S *s perform­
ance time on the CW card five times, i.e., after every
twenty responses. The resultant five time scores form some
kind of pattern for each £. Smith and Klein termed the 
three main patterns as follows: cumulative, disassociative 
and stabilized.
The Oisassociatives' curve rises and falls
discontinuously; this is claimed to reflect a
faltering of attention required in the process 
of isolating the relevant stimulus. The 
Cumulatives curve tends toward increasingly 
slower reading time over the five time scores; 
these Ss^  show continuously aggregating diffi­
culty throughout the performance. The 
Stabilizers' curve maintains an even course, 
remaining more or less horizontal over the 
five time scores; these Ss are most adequate 
to the interference task ("Jensen & Rohwer,
1966; p. 71).
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Smith and Klein (1953) investigated the relationship of 
these response patterns to what has come to be the criterion 
test for 1 evel in g-sharpen in g, i.e., the Schematizing test.
They found that cumulatives tended to show a delayed sensi­
tivity to change; disassociatives showed exaggerated sensi­
tivity to change; although sensitivity to change was more 
refined for stabilizers, changes become more cautious after 
an initially exaggerated expectation. On the Gottschaldt 
figures, which relate to field dependence-independence, 
cumulatives recognized few embedded figures within the time 
limit, whereas disassociatives quickly recognized Gottschaldt 
figures, as did the stabilizers.
Holzman (1954) investigated the relationship of 
1eveling-sharpening to visual, auditory and kinesthetic time 
error. He found that levelers showed significantly greater 
time error in all three modalities than sharpeners. In 
addition, he discovered there was a tendency for an individ­
ual to respond consistently in the three modalities. The 
former finding was consistent with an earlier result obtain­
ed by Holzman and Klein (1954) investigating only visual 
time error.
Gardner ejt al^ . (1959) found a relationship, for 
female Ss_, between 1 evel i n g-sha rpen i n g and responses to a 
f ree-assoc iat ion test. In this latter test, Sjs^ were asked 
to say everything that came to their minds for three minutes 
after hearing first the word "dry'* and then the word "house". 
The levelers showed a) more blocking (difficulty in responding)
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and b) greater difficulty in finding new situations (distinct 
responses). Presumably, this would be due to longstanding 
susceptibility to assimilation effects, i.e., new experiences 
and memory traces of related earlier experiences interact or 
"assimilate*4 thus blurring the perception of the new stimuli. 
Similarly, Holzman and Gardner (1959 ) found that Ss^  who were 
levelers on a neutral psychophysical task relied chiefly on 
repression as a defense mechanism. This finding also re­
plicates one by Gardner £t^  al_. (1959). Gardner and Long 
(1960) did a reliability study on 1 eve 1 ing-sharpening and 
the correlations obtained "offer support for the assumption 
that cognitive controls, as measured by these procedures, 
are relatively enduring features of cognitive organization 
(Gardner and Long, 1960; p. 486)".
The Menninger group went on to investigate the 
possible relations of 1eveling-sharpening to learning.
Gardner and Long (1960) investigated the relationship bet­
ween this control and serial learning. In their study, the 
sharpeners tended to give more responses but they made few­
er errors. In the case of backward errors (i.e., repeating 
earlier items later in the test), they made significantly 
fewer than did the levelers. In their discussion, they 
hypothesized that
... Level ing-Sharpening may have still greater 
effects on learning when the rote-learning 
features of memory-drum experiments do not 
obtain, e.g. when learning occurs in single 
encounters with sequences of stimuli the 
person experiences as similar. Under the 
circumstances, memory is more "representation­
al", less motor-habitual, and may be shaped
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more completely by the consistent individ­
ual differences in assimilation observed 
here and in earlier studies of leveling- 
sharpening (Gardner & Long, 1960; p. 184).
In another study, Gardner and Lohrenz (1962) found that a 
folk tale undergoes much more simplification and alteration 
in serial reproductions by levelers than in serial repro­
ductions by sharpeners, supporting the assumption that 
levelers are more susceptible to assimilation effects.
In addition to the studies reviewed for the in­
dividual controls, a factor analytic study (Gardner et a l ., 
1959) was carried out to test the interrelationships among 
these controls with a single group. They administered a 
number of tests, previously demonstrated as indicative of 
the control principles in question, to thirty male and thirty 
female Ss. There was, however, some variation between and 
within groups - in age, occupation, education, and even in 
one important case, the tests administered. The results 
obtained were that all five hypothesized controls were 
confirmed, however, only for one sex; factors representing 
the control principles of 1eveling-sharpening, equivalence 
range and field articulation appeared in the female sample. 
The field articulation principle, in the female sample, 
appeared to be a combination of the constricted-flexible 
control and field dependent-independence. In the male 
sample, factors representing the control principles of 
tolerance for unrealistic experiences and scanning appeared. 
Gardner e^.al., point out that these results are probably
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more apparent than real, since gross sex differences were 
not apparent in previous studies of these controls.
The two independent factors obtained in the male 
sample account for only twenty percent of the total variance. 
Similarly, in the female sample, the three factors interpre­
ted accounted for only thirty five percent of the variance.
On the one hand, these results could be taken as somewhat 
limited support for the independence of the five control 
factors. On the other hand, the interpretation could be 
that the failure to replicate across factors reflects sex 
differences in terms of preferred cognitive controls. How­
ever, several methodological shortcomings have vital bearing 
on both interpretations. For one thing, the sample sizes 
(thirty in each group) were quite small for a factor analytic 
study; in this context, it is striking that all the hypoth­
esized factors were confirmed for at least one sex. In 
addition, gross sex differences were not apparent in previous 
studies of the control principles. In regard to the cogni­
tive control principle of field dependence-independence, the 
study by Witkin et al. (1954) explored sex differences more 
adequately and found men more consistent than women, which 
is directly contradictory to the findings obtained in the 
Gardner e_t al_. study (1959). Another look at the factors 
obtained from the male sample is thus relevant at this
point. The only factors which were interpreted were factor 
I (scanning - 12.3% of the variance) and factor IV (tolerance
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
for unrealistic experiences - 7.5% of the variance). How­
ever, three other factors appeared (II, III, V) accounting 
for 7,2, 6.7, and 5.9 percent of the variance, respectively. 
The authors felt that factor II could not be interpreted, 
while factor III resembled some aspects of field dependence- 
independence and factor V seemed to represent constricted- 
flexible control and other aspects of field dependence- 
independence. The important point, however, is that eight 
men did not return to take one of the tests for field 
dependence-independence, and they were quite different in 
their performance on other tests, from the rest of the 
sample who did return. On the Embedded Figures Test and 
the Stroop Colour-Uord Test, they came out as more depend­
ent and constricted, respectively, than did the rest of 
the sample. Thus the correlations between the three tests 
which were to form the core of one factor did not appear 
in the male sample. Because of this apparent artifact, 
the two factors were not interpreted.
On the basis of the studies reviewed above, Klein, 
Gardner, Holzman and their associates feel justified in 
stating that they have demonstrated the existence of five 
independent cognitive controls. However, there are many 
problems which this position glosses over. The most basic 
one being that the research on these controls is yet twoo 
small to justify this conclusion, (with the exception of 
Witkin's field dependence-independence) and the research on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
these controls has been carried out almost exclusively by 
the Menninger group, i.e., no extensive confirmation has 
been supplied from independent studies.
The basic criticisms of their methodology comes 
out in their major validation study (Gardner e_t a_l_. , 1959). 
As mentioned earlier, they used too few Ss_ and the two 
groups were quite different. The result was that a separ­
ate analysis was performed on each group, consequently the 
factor analysis was carried out with an N of only 30. The 
significance of the factor loadings obtained is thus sus­
pect. In addition to this basic defect, they also used too 
few criterion measures for the hypothesized factors (only 
two for each control, except constricted-flexible which had 
four). Also, they derived several scores from each test 
which often were not independent and thus likely contributed 
to some of the high factor loadings obtained.
A further problem which has implications for all 
the other studies carried out is that the criterion measures 
are not independent. That is to say, one test which is 
supposed to be the criterion test for one control was also 
found to load other factors as well, casting doubt on the 
independence of the controls. Obviously, until pure criter­
ion tasks are developed the justification for calling them 
independent controls is tenuous. The fact that in specific 
studies S£ separated cleanly in terms of individual differ­
ences can with some validity be interpreted as performance
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
differences specific to the tasks and not necessarily 
characteristic of stable modes of cognitive behavior. How­
ever, despite the limitations and difficulties outlined, 
the writer agrees with Messick's (1961) conclusion that 
"they are suggestive of dimensions of consistent individual 
differences of such potential importance for a comprehensive 
treatment of cognitive and personality organization that 
their implications should be considered seriously and 
further research and refinement of measurement encouraged 
(Messick, 1961; p. 108)".
"Modes of coordination with reality" is the 
foundation of the present study and is of particular import­
ance in understanding cognitive controls. It is important 
to stress that these controls are not defined solely in 
terms of physical specifications of different tasks. The 
main concern is the generality of the controls - "the range 
of situations which pose similar adaptive requirements and 
similar situational characteristics (Gardner e_t al_. , 1959 ; 
p. 14)". Thus a control principle represents the various 
ways in which an individual adapts to his environment when 
the situation allows him the option of employing a certain 
control in a preferred way. Two implications underlie this 
position - one is that antecedent conditions are crucial 
for understanding these controls, and secondly that an in­
dividual can vary with respect to any one control. The 
premise, however, is that a particular individual engages
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in more or less scanning or more or less leveling behavior 
consistently. To iterate, a basic assumption of this study 
is that the cognitive controls are crucial to an understand­
ing of the creative process since it too is a mode of co­
ordination with reality. The point then is to spell out 
relationships between operational descriptions of cognitive 
controls and the adaptation model.
It was postualted that what would characterize 
creative behavior would be a process involving both assim­
ilation and accommodation. Assimilation would involve an 
openness to the environment, voracious consumption of envir­
onmental stimuli and a freedom from conventional structures. 
Accommodation would involve an acute awareness of convent­
ional structures. The creative individual is one who can 
freely modify stimuli to suit his own purposes (assimilate) 
but also respond to the demands of external 'realtiy' (acco­
mmodate) .
The possible relationship of two controls to 
creativity appears fairly straight forward; these are focus­
ing and tolerance for ambiguity. Openness to the environment 
would seem to imply an active perusing of the objects about 
one (focusing) and tolerance for ambiguity involves a free­
dom to accept ideas that deviate from the conventional. How­
ever, the possible relationships of other controls is not 
clear. Gardner and Schoen (1962) suggest that under certain 
conditions Mhigh conceptual differentiation (narrow equival­
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ence range) and extreme sharpening in combination could lead 
to minimal assimilation, low conceptual differentiation and 
leveling to maximal assimilation." Thus the implication is 
that several combinations of these controls may be facili- 
tative of creative behavior. However, the various studies 
by Gardner, Hoizman and his associates suggest that those 
Ss with narrow equivalence range (high in conceptual diff­
erentiation) are more rigid and intolerant of change in 
perceptual schemas once formed. Also the incubation phase 
was characterized by fluid experiences such that they do 
not become stereotyped; it is postulated, in this context 
then, that this requires that an individual demonstrate 
the cognitive control of sharpening. The resoning is that 
in leveldrs experiences lose their individuality resulting 
in extreme assimilation to previous schemata, i.e., stereo­
typing. It is postulated that constricted-flexible will 
not be discriminating because in the present definition of 
the creative process, both ends of the continuum are at 
times highly adaptive to creative functioning. Finally, in 
regard to field dependence-independence, it would appear, 
from its definition, that the ideal mode of relating with 
the environment appears to be the tendency toward field 
independence.
Statement of the Problem 
This study is concerned with an individual's adap­
tive encounter with his environment by investigating what
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are considered to be two basic modes of this encounter - 
intelligence and creativity. These modes of adaptation are 
investigated in the light of cognitive controls which are 
taken to be the dimensions organizing an individual's en­
counter with his environment. Previous investigations on 
cognitive controls have tended to a) concentrate on individ­
ual controls and b) employed adults as Ss. Also very little 
has been done in regard to their relevance to creativity. 
Consequently, the purpose of this study is to investigate 
the cognitive characteristics of the creative process in 
children in the light of cognitive controls. A subsidiary 
purpose is to replicate some of the results obtained by 
Wallach and Kogan (1965). They presented evidence for the 
distinction between intelligence and creativity and also 
presented partial evidence for the relevance of cognitive 
controls to creativity. In addition, an attempt is made to 
integrate the theoretical delineations of creativity and 
cognitive controls with Pieaget's concept of intelligence.
The expected relationship of each control to creativity and 
intelligence will be presented in turn.
In the cognitive control of field dependence-in­
dependence, the more field independent Ss_ were considered to 
be those Sjs who were able to overcome the influence of the 
surrounding field and separate an item from its context. 
Consequently, since this would appear to be the most adaptive 
end of the continuum, it is expected that high creative
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will be characterized by field independence* However, as 
pointed out previously (p. 22), earlier studies have demon­
strated a relationship between field independence and intell­
igence. Consequently, it is expected that the high creative- 
high intelligent Ss_ will tend to be the more field independ- 
end and the low creative-low intelligent JSs, the more field 
dependent.
The cognitive control of constricted-flexible 
delineates modes of reacting to contradictory and intrusive 
cues from the environment. From the theoretical delineation 
(pp. 25-37), it would appear that either end of the contin­
uum would be adaptive for creative functioning. Consequent­
ly, for this control it is expected that the null hypothesis 
would be confirmed and no relationship to creativity demon­
strated. Theoretically, the constricted end of the contin­
uum would appear to be more related to intelligent (converg­
ent) functioning than the flexible end. Thus, it is expected 
that high intelligent Ss^  will tend to be constricted. The 
moderating effects that creativity might have in relation 
to intelligence and this control are not known, although 
from the above it would be expected that there will be no 
interaction effects.
For the focusing-scanning control, the most adapt­
ive end of the continuum would appear to be the focusing end 
since, in the present definition, it is assumed to be the 
most efficient in acquiring information from the environment.
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Thus, it is expected that the high creative Ss_ will tend to 
be the focusers. Since high intelligence would be facilit- 
ative of adaptive intercourse with one's environment, it 
would be expected to have a moderating effect on focusing- 
scanning. Thus, it is expected that the high creative-high 
intelligent Sjs will occupy the focusing end and the low 
creative-low intelligent the scanning end of the continuum.
The cognitive control of tolerance for ambiguity, 
in the present definition, involves the ability to resist 
premature closuer. This would appear to involve the freedom 
not to converge on the accepted solution. This freedom is 
essential to creative functioning. Thus it is expected that 
the high creative Sijs will tend to be characterized by tol­
erance for ambiguity and the low creative Sjs by intolerance 
for ambiguity. The possible moderating effects of intell­
igence are not known.
In regard to the control of equivalence range, 
either end of the continuum appears to be at times approp­
riate for the intercourse with one's environment involved 
in creative functioning. Thus it is expected that for this 
control the null hypothesis will be confirmed and no relation­
ship to creativity demonstrated. This expected finding was 
previously obtained in the study by Wallach and Kogan (1965). 
In their study, the number of objects score for equivalence 
range demonstrated no relationship to creativity or intell- 
i gence.
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The theoretical delineation of 1eveling-sharpening 
indicated that leveling (assimilation of stimuli) leads to 
stereotyping. Consequently, it is proposed that high creative 
Ss would tend to be sharpeners. Since it is expected that 
high intelligent Ss^  could more easily resist assimilation 
than low intelligent S£, it is suggested that the high 
creative-high intelligent S_s will tend to occupy the 
sharpening end of the continuum and the low intelligent- 
low creative, the leveling end of the continuum.
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE
Experimental Sample 
The _Ss employed in this study were sixty boys in 
the fifth grade of elementary school. It was intended that 
they be between their tenth and eleventh birthdays, however 
to obtain sufficient ^s several boys who were chosen turned 
eleven shortly before or during the testing. The mean age 
of the boys was 10.63 with a standard deviation of 5.13 
months calculated from the middle of the testing period.
All £>js were from four Roman Catholic elementary schools in 
the same suburban area. No other selection factors were 
taken into account. Boys at this age level were chosen 
primarily because of the author's interest in investigating 
creativity in children, and second1y because the creativity 
tasks employed had previously been employed only with this 
age sample (Wallach & Kogan, 1965).
Testing Materials 
The tests employed in this study were a) three 
measures of intelligence (the comprehension, vocabulary, and 
block design subscales from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Children)} b) three measures of creativity (Alternate
53
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Uses, Similarities, and Pattern Meanings - Wallach & Kogan, 
1965); and c) seven measures of cognitive controls (Embedded 
Figures Test, Stroop Colour-Word Test, Object Sorting Test,
Category-Width Test, the Schematizing Test and two measures 
designed by the author - focusin g-scannin g and tolerance for 
amb i gu i ty ).
The administration and scoring of the intelligence 
measures followed the general procedure set down in the W1SC 
manual (Uechsler, 1949). These scales were chosen because 
of their higher (relative to other subscales) correlations 
with the full scale IQ. The correlations for comprehension, 
vocabulary and block design with the full scale score (for 
10% year old) were .69, .83 and .64, respectively (Wechsler, 
1949). For the same group, reported reliabilities were .73, 
.91 and .87 respectively. The raw scores for the three 
measures were converted to standard scores and then summed 
to yield an IQ index score for each J3.
The three creativity tasks are presented in Appen­
dix A. The first, Alternate Uses, asks the child to gener­
ate possible uses for a verbally specified object, e.g. 
newspaper. The Similarities task involves generating 
possible similarities between two verbally specified objects. 
Finally in the third task, Pattern Meanings, the child is 
asked to generate possible meanings or interpretations for 
each of a number of abstract visual designs. Also, the child 
is requested to consider the drawing as a whole in giving
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his response. The originators of these tasks (Wallach & 
Kogan, 1965) derived two scores for each task: a) number of 
unique responses and b) the total number of responses pro­
duced by the child. Table 1 presents the Spearman-Brown 
split-half reliability coefficients reported by Wallach and 
Kogan (1965) for these scores.
TABLE 1
Spearman-Brown Split-Half Reliability 
Coefficients for the Six Creativity 
Variables (N - 151)
Alternate Uses - uniqueness .87
Alternate Uses - number .93
Similarities - uniqueness .87
Similarities - number . 93
Pattern Meanings - uniqueness .88
Pattern Meanings - number . 93
Turning to validity, it is obvious that this is a 
crucial problem which has not been adequately solved in rel­
ation to studies of this nature. Outside assessment of the 
creative ability of these £s would involve the kind of de­
tailed clinical and biographical study of each child that is 
impossible to carry out in practice. In addition, there 
was insufficient material from the Ss_* performances in 
school to employ any indices from this area. At present, 
then, the most that can be done to facilitate the validity 
of the tasks is to see that the assessment of the Ss' creative
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ability is consistent with the theoretical delineation of 
what constitutes a creative response.
In this light, then, two additional scores were 
added (appropriateness and transformation) consistent with 
the delineation of a creative product in chapter one. The 
instructions on which the scoring of the responses was 
based are presented in Appendix B.
The four scores (total number - henceforth termed 
flexibility, uniqueness, appropriateness, and transformation) 
were then summed to hield a total score for each test.
These raw scores were then converted to standard scores and 
summed to yield a creativity index score for each S_. In 
addition, each of the original scores were summed across 
tests to yield total scores on flexibility, uniqueness, 
appropriateness and transformation.
Embedded Figures Test (Field Dependence-independence)
The standard form of this test was established by 
Witkin (1950); it consists of eight simple figures and 
twenty-four complex figures. These figures were the original 
Gottschaldt figures which Witkin made more difficult by 
adding colours to all but one. The object of this test is 
for the j» to find the simple figure which is embedded in the 
complex one. In this study a short form of the test was 
employed (Jackson, 1956), which consists of 12 out of the 24 
complex figures. The correlations between the shortened and 
full scale EFT reported by Jackson (1956) were in the mid-
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ninties for several groups of subjects. The score on this 
test is simply the total time required to complete the task.
A high score is assumed to represent the field dependent end 
and a low score the field independent end of the continuum.
Stroop Colour-Word Test (Constricted-Flexible)
There is no standard version of the Stroop test 
with respect to either the materials, the administration, or 
the scoring. The original test (Stroop, 1935b) consisted of 
three cards: a word card (W), a colour-card (C) and a colour- 
word card (C-W). The W card consisted of the words red, 
blue, green, brown, and purple arranged in a 10 x 10 matrix 
and printed in black ink on a white card. The C card con­
sisted of colour patches in place of the words on the W 
card. Finally, on the C-W card, the 10 x 10 matrix consist­
ed of the words of the five colours employed printed in an
incongruous colour, e.g., the word red would be printed in 
blue ink. On this card each colour name appears an equal
number of times in each of the four other colours. However,
the exact size of the cards, the size or shape of the colour 
patches or their spacing were not specified. Many other 
forms have since been employed which were simple variations 
on the basic format employed by Stroop. Jensen & Rohwer 
(1966) on the basis of their review of the various techni­
ques employed concluded that any version of this test should
a) avoid the appearance of doublets of the same colour or 
word in immediate succession; b) require a different sequence
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of responses on each of the cards to avoid sequential pract­
ice effects from one card to another; c) have every colour 
(and every word) follow every other colour an equal number 
of times.
The form adopted in this study incorporated the 
characteristic elements in previous versions of this test 
plus the suggestions listed above. There were three cards, 
W, C, C-W. The word cards W and C-W were printed in upper­
case letters, double-spaced and in a 10 x 10 matrix. The 
C card consisted of colours which were the same size as a 
six letter word printed in upper-case letters. The test 
was slightly modified, however, in that on the C-W card 
instead of the words being printed in an incongruous colour, 
they were printed in black and bounded with a border of 
an incongruous colour.
The basic scores on the Stroop are time measures 
for the three cards, thus W, C and CW. A great many scores 
have been derived from these three. However, Jensen (1965), 
in his factor analysis of this test obtained three factors 
on which two of the basic scores and some of the derived 
scores emerge as almost independent measures of a particular 
factor. The first factor obtained was that of colour diffi­
culty and was unambiguously represented by C/(C+W). The 
second factor was interference and the score CW-C was the 
purest measure of this factor and consequently was employed 
here. A high score on this factor is indicative of con-
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striction, while a low score represents flexibility. The 
third factor was a speed factor. The basic time score W 
was the only "pure" measure of this factor. Thus the five 
scores were adopted for this study: W, C, CW, CW-C, and 
C/(C+W). The correlations reported by Jensen (1965) for 
these measures are presented in tables 2 and 3.
TABLE 2
Spearman-Brown Test-Retest Reliability 
Coefficients for W, C, CU, CW-C and 
C/(C + W) (N - 436)
W - (Reading Time on W card)
C - (Reading Time on C card)
CW - (Reading Time on CW card) 
CW-C - (interference score)
C/(C+W) - (colour difficulty)
TABLE 3
Spearman-Brown Reliability Coefficients 
for 10 administrations for W, C, CW, 
CW-C, and C/(C+W) (N-50)
w .86
c .86
CW .84
CW-C . 56
C/(C+W) .77
Focus in g-Scannin g
In the theoretical delineation of focusing- 
scanning it was stated that what basically distinguishes
.88
.79
.71
.48
.72
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focusers from scanners is the extent of systematic deploy­
ment of attention and the resultant efficiency in absorbing 
information from the environment. In the present writer's 
view the adequate assessment of this control "per se" would 
involve the tracking of eye-movement in each S_, However, 
this task was beyond the scope of the present study. On 
the assumption that efficiency in deployment of attention 
results in more information being received, the experimenter 
devised a simple procedure to test this control. It consisted 
of having the Ss_ observe an array of 15 objects for 15 seconds, 
and then recount as many of them as they could remember.
The objects employed were from the Kahn Test of Symbol 
Arrangement. Two main scores were derived: a) the number of 
objects and b) errors - a high score on number of objects 
and a low score on errors being indicative of focusing.
However, the number of objects recounted may be more a func­
tion of short term memory than of the cognitive control of 
focusing-scanning. To somewhat obviate this limitation 
points were assigned on a fixed scale of increasing distance 
from the centre of the array of objects. The reasoning being 
that a focuser (by definition) since he scans the stimulus 
field more systematically and efficiently, will tend to 
recount more objects on the periphery than a scanner. Thus 
Ss with a high score presumably are focusers. This test may
or may not correlate highly with the measures for focusing- 
scanning employed previously. To attempt some validation 
of this procedure, two forms of the test were administered
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to the _Ss. Form A, with a wide spread array, by definition 
of this control, should inhibit the performance of scanners, 
while on form B, with a tight array of objects hypothetically 
there should be less distinction between focusers and scann­
ers.
Object Sorting Test (Equivalence Range)
The Object Sorting Test employed in this study 
was Wallach and Kogan's (1965) adaptation of the Clayton 
and Jackson (1961) Object-Sorting Test, which consisted of 
fifty familiar objects. In its present form, it is made up 
of fifty line drawings of the same objects. The pictures 
were laid out in five rows of ten pictures and each S_ was 
asked to arrange the cards in groups. Upon completion of 
the grouping task, the S was questioned about the reasons 
for the particular groups formed. The scores which were 
derived from this procedure are a) conceptual differentiation 
score, which is the number of groups containing two or more 
objects; b) the compartmentalization score, which is the 
number of objects left ungrouped; and c) percentage of pairs, 
groups containing only two objects. Narrow equivalence 
range is indicated by a high conceptual differentiation score 
and broad equivalence range by a low score. An index of 
internal consistency obviously could not be obtained for 
this measure. However, Sloane, Gorlow, and Jackson (1963) 
reported a correlation of .75 between alternate forms of 
this test. The versions they employed were group-administ­
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ered paper-and-penci1 tasks and were given to adults, but 
it * s of ,55 and .53 with the individually administered object 
sorting test of Gardner (1953) were obtained. For the con­
ceptual differentiation score, Gardner and Long (1960) report­
ed a correlation of .75 (p<.001).
The reasons for the groupings were scored accord­
ing to the scoring system outlined by Oliver and Hornsby 
(1966). There are two main divisions to this system; a) 
the characteristics used as the basis of equivalence (the 
five modes being perceptual', functional, affective, nominal, 
and fiat equivalence), and b) the structure of the groupings 
(superordinate, complexive, and thematic). Percentage scores 
were computed for all these measures. The instructions 
given to the judges for scoring this test are presented in 
Appendix C.
Category Width Test
The procedure employed for this control was that 
devised by Wallach and Caron (1959) which they adapted for 
children from the Pettigrew (1958) category-width test.
The task is presented as a guessing game and consists of 
twelve questions, which are presented in Appendix D. The 
score on this test was obtained by keying both parts of 
each item 1, 2, 3, or 4 representing responses that are 
least to most discrepant from the central tendency provided 
for each item. The twenty-four values were then summed to 
yield a total score. Wallach and Kogan (1965) obtained an
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odd-even reliability coefficient of .76. Finally, a high 
score on this test is indicative of a preference for broad 
band widths and a small score reflects a preference for 
narrow band widths.
Tolerance for Ambiguity
As stated in chapter one, tolerance for ambiguity 
is defined specifically in terms of the tendency to premature 
closure. The task for measuring this control was designed 
by the experimenter and is similar to the experimental ambi­
guity task reported by Smock (1954). The task required each 
to organize partially structured stimuli into a complete 
picture or design in order to obtain the correct response. 
Each £  was administered six series of 10 cards. Each series 
represents a successively more clearly delineated picture.
The stimuli employed in this study were a) a goat, b) a 
car, c) a butterfly, d) a man, e) an engine, and f) a 
giraffe. Drawing F is presented in Appendix E. Prior to 
the administration of each series five possible answers 
were presented to the jS, one of which was the correct respon­
se. The list was left exposed throughout the series. This 
precaution was adopted in an attempt to rule out memory as 
an important variable. Also, a five card sample series 
(flower) was presented to familiarize the with the task. 
Four scores were recorded: a) mean trial of first response;
b) mean trial of first correct response; c) mean trial on 
which correct response stabilizes (either the second response
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of a string of only correct responses, or the first correct 
response which was not followed by any erroneous responses); 
d) number of response changes before score C. The criterion 
response for this task is score A; scores B and C were in­
cluded but are not directly relevant. These scores were 
included because Smock (1957) and Draguns and Multari (1961)
i
reported a significant correlation between intelligence and 
the first correct response. Levitt's (1953) score for in­
tolerance for ambiguity (in a similar procedure) was the 
number of responses other than "don't know" made prior to 
the point of clear perception. Consequently, score 0 was 
included as possibly another and different measure or aspect 
of intolerance for ambiguity.
Schematizing Test (Level ing-Sharpening)
This test requires an :S to make size judgments on 
a succession of 150 squares of light which gradually increase 
in size. There are fourteen squares in the test ranging in 
size from 1.3 to 13.7. The squares were projected on a 
screen in a dark room. At the beginning of the test, the 
five smallest squares were presented, first in sequence and 
then twice in random order. The smallest square was then 
dropped and a larger square than any of the first five was 
added without interrupting the sequence of presentation. In 
this manner, by successively adding the next largest and 
dropping the smallest square, the range of squares was tra­
versed. Two scores were computed for this test, a) percent­
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age ranking accuracy and b) mean percentage increment error. 
The percentage ranking accuracy score was obtained by divid­
ing the number of stimuli correctly ranked by the maximum 
number (150). If two or more stimuli were judged the same 
size within a sub-series, they were given 1/2 the accuracy 
credit they would obtain if they were not tied and were 
properly ranked - so long as they appeared at the appropriate 
place in the ranking. The mean percentage increment error 
score was obtained by subtracting the average actual increase 
in size from the judgments of size of each £. Five increment 
values were obtained (ignoring sign) which were then averaged 
to obtain an increment error score for each _S. A high score 
on percentage ranking accuracy is assumed to represent the 
sharpening end of the continuum, while a low score is assumed 
to represent the leveling end. On the mean percentage incr­
ement error scores, a small value is assumed to represent 
the sharpening end and a large value the leveling end of the 
con tinuum.
Gardner and Long (1960) reported a test-retest 
reliability coefficient of .52 (p<.001) for percentage acc­
uracy and .36 (p<.05) for mean percentage increment error. 
Reliabilities for this test would be expected to be low since 
the task necessitates that the £  be naive. Consequently, on 
the retest some Sjs would be aware of the nature of the task 
and their performance would improve - become more accurate.
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Procedure
Initially, the boys were told that the experimenter 
was simply interested in playing a few games with them. Dur­
ing the first session with each £5, a few minutes was spent 
in an attempt to put the S. at ease, and then the instruct­
ions for the first task was given. The instructions for all 
tests are presented in Appendix F*
All tests were administered individually except 
the Band-Width Test and the Schematizing Test and these were 
administered together upon completion of the individual test­
ed to groups of six to nine j>s. The Object Sorting Test, 
one of the focus ing-scanning tests and the Stroop Colour- 
Word Test were administered during the first session as they 
could most easily be presented as a game. The other tests 
were then administered, the primary concern being that each 
experimental session last no longer than forty-five minutes. 
The IQ tests were administered after the creativity tasks 
so that the stress generated by these tests would not spread 
to the creativity tasks. Thus for most Ss_ the experimental 
time consisted of six sessions of approximately a half hour 
each, which were spread over a two month period. However, 
since the attempt to generate a game-like atmosphere, no 
time limit was imposed for the creativity, tasks, except in 
the case of two Sjs who continued responding for an inordin­
ately long period of time (ten minutes per question) in 
which case the experimenter suggested that these Ss_ go on to
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the next item.
Previous researchers had administered the Schema­
tizing test in total darkness, with the Ss^  (adults) being 
supplied with desk lamps or pen flashlights which were turn­
ed on by each £  to record their judgments. However, since 
children were employed in this study and to simplify the 
procedure, the test was administered in semi-darkness. Thus 
there was enough light in the room for the S£ to record 
their judgments but also the room was dark enough for the 
squares to be clearly visible. In addition, on the sugges­
tion of Gardner (1967) the test was terminated after judg­
ment 90.
The focusing-scanning test (A) was administered 
twice to an additional group of Ss^  to test the reliability 
of this procedure. The two sessions were three weeks apart. 
In addition, the tolerance for ambiguity test was adminis­
tered to these Ss. Half of the test was administered dur­
ing the first session and half during the subsequent session.
Three graduate students in psychology scored the 
responses to the creativity tasks and the reasons for the 
Object Sorting Test. The instructions for scoring was 
given to the three judges in a group, then a complete set 
of the responses was given to each judge and they were asked 
to score the responses independently.
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CHAPTER III 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The reliabilities of the procedures designed by 
the experimenter (focusing-scanning and tolerance for am­
biguity) and the inter-scorer percentage agreements for the 
creativity tasks and Object Sorting Test were determined 
first. The test-retest reliability coefficients for 
focusing-scanning and the split-half reliability coeffic­
ients for tolerance for ambiguity are presented in table 4.
TABLE 4
Reliability Coefficients for Focusing-Scanning 
and Tolerance for Ambiguity (N-30)
Focusin g-Scanning
Number of Objects 75
Differential Score 64
Tolerance for Ambiguity
Mean First Response 82
Mean Number of Response Changes 42
The number of objects and mean first response are the scores 
of primary interest and fairly high reliabilities were 
obtained. Percentage agreement between judges for Altern­
ate Uses, Similarities, Pattern Meanings and Object Sorting
68
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Test are presented in Table 5.
TABLE 5
Percentage Agreement between judges for Alternate Uses 
(AU), Similarities (Sim), Pattern Meanings (PM), and 
Object Sorting Test (OST)
Tes t Jud ges
Uniqueness
Score
Appropriateness Transformation
AU 1 , 2 & 3 65 51 22
2 of 3 100 98 86
1 & 2 85 7 3 66
Sim 1, 2 & 3 65 62 30
2 of 3 100 100 100
1 & 2 84 71 70
PM 1 , 2 & 3 74 66 26
2 of 3 94 97 83
1 & 2 90 75 67
OST 1, 2 & 
2 of 3
3 75
97
The inter-scorer reliability obtained between all three 
judges was quite low. However, the higher percentage of 
agreement between judges one and two indicates that a large 
portion of the disagreement was accounted for by judge three. 
This was particularly evident for the transformation score, 
where judge three consistently awarded a higher score than
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judges one and two. However, a very high percentage of 
agreement was obtained when the criterion was taken to be 
agreement between any two of the three judges. Consequently, 
for purposes of scoring, when at least two judges agreed on 
a score, that score was assigned for the response. For the 
creativity tasks, when all three disagreed, the lowest 
(most conservative score) was assigned. No score was assign­
ed for the Object Sorting Test, since there was no justifi­
cation for accepting one over another.
The intercorrelations among and between the 
creativity and intelligence measures will now be considered. 
The intercorrelations among the creativity measures for the 
sample of sixty boys are presented in table 6.
TABLE 6
Intercorrelations among Creativity Measures - 
Alternate Uses (AU), Similarities (Sim) Pattern 
Meanings (PM), Flexibility (Flex), Uniqueness 
(Unip), Appropriateness (Approp), Transforma­
tion (Trans) and Creativity Index (N-60)
AU Sim PM Flex Uniq App rop Trans
Sim 56
PM 62 76
Flex 73 89 91
Uniq 76 88 94 96
App rop 74 80 85 88 91
Trans 77 85 94 95 99 92
Crea tivi ty 72 87 83 91 93 86 92
Index
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The intercorrelations among the creativity measures are very 
high, with most of the correlations being above .80.
The intercorrelations among the intelligence 
measures are presented in table 7.
TABLE 7
Intercorrelations among Intelligence Measures
Comprehension Vocabulary Block Design
Vocabulary 49
Block Desi gn -18 25
I .Q . Index 64 76 58
The intercorrelations among the three intelligence measures 
are not as high as would be desirable. Although their 
correlations with the IQ index score are only slightly less 
than that reported by Wechsler (1949) between these three 
tests and the Full Scale I.Q., the disparity among the 
scores casts doubt on the validity of the intelligence dimen­
sion.
Turning now to the relationship between intelli­
gence and creativity, the intercorrelations between the 
various measures are presented in table 8. The intercorrela­
tions obtained are generally not significant. However, the 
correlations between vocabulary and all the creativity scores 
except similarities and pattern meanings were significant
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beyond Che *05 level. Thus, although Che correlations are 
generally in agreement with Wallach and Kogan (1965), they 
are not unambiguously definitive of two distinct modes of 
behavior because of the significant correlations with voc­
abulary.
TABLE 8
Intercorrelations between Creativity and Intelligence 
Measures (N « 60)
AU Sim PM Flex Unip Approp Trans Creat.
Index
Comprehension 15 11 07 14 11 05 12 11
Vocabulary 40**20 22 26* 28* 30* 29* 31*
Block Design 03 06 10 05 09 10 08 12
IQ Index Score 25 17 18 21 22 20 22 25
* - .05 level 
**- .01 level
of si gnif icance 
of si gnif icance
The relationships between creativity and intelli­
gence and the various cognitive controls can now be consid­
ered. The sixty S_s were divided into four groups on the 
basis of their creativity index score and the IQ index score. 
Table 9 presents the number of Ss_ in each cell when the 
split on both variables is on the median. The expected 
relative orthogonality of creativity and intelligence was 
not borne out by the actual distribution of Ss obtained on
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the median split. However, to obtain equal cells, the S£ 
were first split into high and low on creativity and then 
within each creativity group, the Ss^  were further split into 
high and low on intelligence, thus yielding 15 Ss^  per cell.
TABLE 9
Median Split for Intelligence and Creativity
Creativi ty
Hi gh Low
Hi gh 19 11
Intel 1i genee
Low 9 21
For the high creativity S£, the range of scores 
on the creativity index score was from -.50 to +13.48, 
while the range for the low creativity Ss_ was from -.63 
to -3.16. Within the high creativity group, the high in­
telligence scores ranged between +.52 and +2.73. For the 
low intelligence scores, the range was from +.42 to -3.23. 
Within the low creativity JSs, the high intelligence scores 
ranged from -.49 to +5.15, while the low intelligences were 
between -.69 and -3.51. The IQ index score and the 
creativity index scores are presented in Appendix G.
Twenty-nine scores were computed from the eight 
tests administered to the sixty j»s_. These scores are pre­
sented in table 10. As delineated in Chapter II, the scores
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TABLE 10
Scores derived from the Cognitive Control Tests
Score Test
1 Total Time (FD-I) Embedded Figures
2 W Stroop Colour-Word
3 C
4 CW
5 CW - C
6 C/(C*W)
7 Number of Objects (F-SA) Foeusing-Scanning A
8 Errors
9 Differential Score
10 Number of Objects (F-SB) Focusing-Scanning B
11 Errors
12 Differential Score
13 Number of Groups (E-R) Object Sorting Test
14 Number of Singles (N of S)
15 Percentage Pairs
16 Band Width (B-W) Category Width Test
17 Mean First Response (MFR) Tolerance for
18 Mean First Correct Response Ambiguity
19 Mean Trial Correct
Response Stabilizers
20 Number of Response Changes
Before Score 19
21 Percentage Ranking Schematizing Test
Accu rac y
22 Percentage Increment Error
23 Percentage Perceptible Object Sorting Test
24 Percentage Functional
25 Percentage Nominal
26 Percentage Fiat Equivalence
27 Percentage Superordinate
Groupin g
28 Percentage Complexive
Grouping
29 Percentage Thematic
Group in g
most directly relevant to the present study are 1, 5, 7, 9, 
10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, and 22. The other scores
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are not directly relevant, since they are not measures of 
cognitive control. For each of the relevant scores, the 
means, standard deviations and a 2 x 2 analysis of variance 
was computed for the four groups and each score was correl­
ated with every other score. The intercorrelations for all 
scores are presented in Appendix H, while the means, stand­
ard deviations and analyses of variance for the remaining 
scores (not directly relevant) are presented in Appendix I.
Before considering each control individually, the 
intercorrelations for the total sample will be considered. 
The intercorrelations for the scores most directly related 
to cognitive control are presented in table 11. Except for 
two correlations, all those reported in table 11 as signifi­
cant are for scores within tests or between two versions of 
the same test. For example, the four scores for focusing- 
scanning A and B were significantly related. Similarly, 
the trial of first response and the number of response chan­
ges scores for tolerance for ambiguity were significantly 
negatively correlated. Finally, the two scores derived from 
the Schematizing test were also significantly negatively 
correlated, as expected from the definition of the scores. 
Outside of these within-test correlations, the only other 
significant correlations were negative ones between field 
dependence-independence (FO-I) and Foe using-Scanning A and 
B (F-SA and F-SB). The relationship that seemed to be in­
dicated was a tendency for field dependence to be inversely
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related to focusing. Very low correlations were obtained 
between all other controls. The individual controls will 
now be considered.
Field Dependence-Independence
The means and the analysis of variance for total 
time on the Embedded Figures Test for the four groups are 
presented in table 12. The standard deviations for the 
groups are reported in parentheses below the means. It is 
clear from table 12 that in this study the field dependent 
Ss were those Ss_ who were either high creative-low intelli­
gent (HC-LI) or low creative-high intelligent (LC-HI). The 
mean score for the low creative-low intelligent £s (LC-LI) 
indicated that these S_s tended to be field dependent (high 
scores). Finally, the high creative-high intelligent S_s 
(HC-HI) tended to achieve scores mid-way between the two 
ends of the dependent-independent continuum. The analysis 
of variance yielded no significant effect for either creat­
ivity or intelligence, however there was a significant 
interaction between creativity and intelligence for field 
dependence-independence which was significant beyond the .05 
1 evei.
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TABLE 12
Means for Total Time on the Embedded Figures Test for the 
Four Groups (N - 60)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low Hi gh ♦ Low
INTELLIGENCE
High 1488.80
(427.40)
1290.53 
(414.00)
1389.67 
(432. 27 )
Low 1303.07
(584.49)
1720.00
(594.62)
1511.53 
(625.35)
High
♦
Low
1395.93 
(520.36)
1505.27 
(555.51)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Sou rce SS df MS F
Creativi ty 
In tel 1igence 
Interaction 
Wi th in Cells
180400.00 1
223900.00 1 
1418000.00 1
15620000.00 56
180400.00
223900.00 
1418000.00
278946.43
.65
.80
5.08**
** F .95 (1. 56 ) » 4.02
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Constricted-Flexible
The means and analysis of variance for the CW-C 
score on the Stroop Colour-Word Test for the four groups 
are presented in table 13.
TABLE 13
Means for CW-C score on the Stroop Colour-Word Test for 
the four groups (N-60)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low Hi gh + Low
INTELLIGENCE
Hi gh 62.27
(33.37)
64. 33 
(23.79)
63. 30 
(29.00)
Low 56. 73 
(23. 54)
53. 67 
(24.12)
55.20
(23.88)
Hi gh 
+ 
Low
59. 50 
(29.01 )
59.00 
(24.54)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Sou rce SS df MS F
Crea t iv i ty 
Intel 1igence 
Interac tion 
Within Cells
150.60
1069.00
122.00
35370.00
1
1
1
56
150.60 .24 
1069.00 1.69
122.00 .19
631.61
* F .90 (1,56) - 2 .78
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For this control, it was found that HI S_s obtained higher 
CW-C scores (tended to be more constricted) than did the 
low intelligent (LI) S_s. However, this effect was not 
significant and no relationship to creativity was demon­
strated.
The intercorrelations between field dependence- 
independence and constricted-flexible within each group of 
Ss are presented in table 14. As demonstrated in table 14, 
a significant relationship was obtained between field 
dependence-independence and constricted-flexible for HC-HI 
and LC-HI Ss. The LC-HI Ss_ appeared to be the most field 
independent and the most constricted. This correlation was 
significant beyond the .05 level. The HC-HI _Ss, however, 
tended to be constricted and in the middle range on field 
dependence-independence. No other correlations were sign- 
if icant.
Focusing-Scanning
The means and analysis of variance for the "number 
of objects'* score on the Focusing-Scanning A test are pre­
sented in table 15. As demonstrated by the means in table 
15, the high creative Sjs^ tended to recount more objects than 
did the low creative Sjs, thus by the definition of this con­
trol, would be termed focusers. In addition, the HI jSs_ 
tended to be focusers and the LI Ss^  scanners. The analysis 
of variance yielded a significant effect at the .01 level 
for creativity; however, the effect for intelligence only
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TABLE 14
Intercorrelations between Field Dependence-independence and 
Constricted-Flexible for the four groups
INTELLIGENCE
CREATIVITY 
H i gh Low Hi gh + Low
Hi gh -56* 54* -11
Low -30 -39 -35
Hi gh
♦
Low
-38 -09
* .05 level of significance
reached .10 level of significance. No significant interac­
tion was demonstrated. In the extreme, then, the HC-HI S^ s 
tended to be the focusers and the LC-LI S_s the scanners. 
Table 16 presents the means and analysis of variance for 
the differential score on Focusing-Scanning A for the four 
groups.
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TABLE 15
Means for the number of objects score on the Focusing-
Scanning A Test for the Four Groups (N-60)
CREATIVITY
High Low H i gh 4 Low
Hi gh
INTELLIGENCE
Low
9.00
(2.25)
7.80 
(2.01 )
8.40
(2 .2 2 )
8 . 33 
(1.81)
6.67
(1.74)
7. 50 
(1.96)
Hi gh 
♦ 
Low
8.67
(2.07)
7.23
(1.96)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Sou rce SS df MS F
Creativi ty 30.00 1 30.00 7.46***
In tel 1i gence 12.14 1 12.14 2.94*
Interaction .80 1 .80 .00
Within Cells 231.00 56 4.13
* F.90 (1, 56) - 2.78
*** F .99 (1 , 56) - 7.13
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TABLE 16
Means for the Differential score on the Focusing-Scanning
A Test for the Four Groups (N ■ 60)
INTELLIGENCE
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low
Hi gh 20.60 18.47
(5.17) (4.63)
Low 19.40 15.60
(4.14) (3.76)
Hi gh + Low
19.53
(5.02)
17.50
(4.39)
High 
+ 20.00 
Low (4.73)
17.03
(4.45)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Sou rc e SS df MS F
C rea tivi ty 131.90 1 131.90 6 .2 0 **
Intel 1 i gence 61.97 1 61.97 2.91*
Interac tion 10. 33 1 10.33 .49
Within Cells 1191.00 56 21.27
* F .go (1, 56) - 2.78 
** F .95 (1, 56) - 4.02
Although slightly less significant, the differential score 
demonstrated the same relationship to creativity and in­
telligence as did the number of objects score. In the 
extreme, the HC-HI Ss tended to be focusers and the LC-LI
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Ss scanners. The intercorrelations between focusing- 
scanning A (number of objects) and field dependence-independ­
ence and constricted-flexible within each group are presented 
in table 17.
TABLE 17
Intercorrelations between Focusing-Scanning A (number of 
objects) and Field Dependence-independence (FD-I) and 
Constricted-Flexible (C-F)
CREATIVITY
High Low Hi gh + Low
High FD-I 11 -37 -05
C-F -40 -10 -28
INTELLIGENCE
Low FD-I -1 7 -0 5 -24
C-F 06 1 5 12
Hi gh FD-I -01 -28
+ C-F -21 08
Low
In regard to the correlations between Focusing-Scanning A
and Field Dependence-independence and Constricted-Flexible 
no significant relationships were indicated.
The means and analysis of variance for the number 
of objects score on the Focusing-Scanning B test are pre­
sented in table 18.
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TABLE 18
Means for Number of Objects score on the Focusing-
Scanning B test for the Four Groups (N-60)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low Hi gh + Low
INTELLIGENCE
High 9.07
(1.65)
8.13
(1.54)
8 . 60 
(1.67)
Low 8.73
(1.61)
7.13
(2.03)
7.93 
(1.99)
Hi gh 8.90
(1.64)
7.63
(1.87)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Sou rce SS df MS F
C rea t iv i ty 24.12 1 24.12 7 .6 3***
In tel 1i gence 6.67 1 6.67 2.11
Interaction 1.62 1 1.62 .51
* F t90 (1,56) - 
*** F <99 (1 ,56) -
2. 78 
7.1
Focusing-scanning B demonstrates the same relationship t<
creativity and intelligence as Focusing-Scanning A. On the 
continuum from focusing to scanning, the S_s^ fall in the 
same progression - HC-HI, HC-LI, LC-HI, and LC-LI, Once
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again the effect for creativity, on the analysis of variance, 
was significant beyond the .01 level. There was a tendency 
for an effect for intelligence but this did not reach signi­
ficance. As previously demonstrated with focusing-scanning 
A, then, (see table 16) the focusers tended to be the high 
creative Ss, while the scanners tended to be the low creative 
Ss. The means and analysis of variance for the differential 
score on focusing-scanning B are presented in table 19.
As was pointed out previously (see table 11), the 
•'number of objects" score and the "differential score" for 
focusing-scanning B were highly correlated. However, the 
effect for creativity for the latter score was considerably 
less significant than that for the number of objects score.
For the number of objects score, the effect for creativity 
was significant beyond the .01 level, while for the differ­
ential score it was only significant at the .10 level. The 
creativity effect on the latter score was also less signif­
icant than the same differential score for focusing-scanning 
A; the significance levels were .10 and .05, respectively.
Thus the anticipated (see p. 58) differential effect bet­
ween focusing-scanning A and B was obtained. As indicated 
(on p. 58) focusing-scanning B was less discriminating than 
focusing-scanning A. The intercorrelations between focusing- 
scanning B (number of objects) and Field Dependence-independ­
ence, Constricted-Flexible, and Focusing-Scanning A (F-SA) 
are presented in table 2 0 .
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TABLE 19
Means for the Differential Score on the Focusing-Scanning
B Test for the Four Groups (N«60)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low H i gh ♦ Low
High 21.20 18.93 20.07
(4.21) (4.06) (4.29)
INTELLIGENCE
Low 19.87 17.67 18.77
(3.26) (5.37) (4.58)
Hi gh
+ 20. 52 18. 30
Low (3.83) (4.80)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Sou rce SS df MS F
C rea tivi ty 74.76 1 74.76 3.81*
In tel 1 i gene e 25. 34 1 25. 34 1 .29
Interaction .06 1 .06 .00
Wi th in Cel 1s 1099.00 56 19.63
*F #90 (1,56) - 2.78
Although the total correlation between Focusing-Scanning A 
and B was significant, among the subgroups this correlation 
was significant only for the LI group. Similarly, although 
there was a significant negative correlation between
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TABLE 20
Intercorrelations between Focusing-Scanning A and Field
Dependence-independence (FD-I), Constricted-Flexible (C-F),
and Focusing-Scanning A (F-SA)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low Hi gh ♦ Low
FD-I -1 5 -43 -20
Hi gh C-F 24 -34 00
F-SA 20 33 31
INTELLIGENCE
FD-I -53* -50 -58**
Low C-F 48 06 25
F-SA 46 30 48**
Hi gh FD-I -34 -53**
♦ C-F 34 -04
Low F-SA 32 36
* .05 level of si gni ficance
** .01 level of si gni f icance
focusing-scanning B and field dependence-independence for 
the total sample, within groups a significant correlation 
was found only for the LC and LI groups.
Object Sorting Test
The means for the "number of groups" score 
(equivalence range) for the four groups are presented in 
table 21. This table suggests that the HI Sj^  tended to 
have a broader equivalence range than LI Ss, however this 
effect was not significant and no relationship with creativity
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TABLE 21
Means for the Number of Groups score (Equivalence Range)
for the Four Groups (N-60)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low H i gh ♦ Low
INTELLIGENCE
Hi gh 11.40
(3.99)
11.67
(5.20)
11.53
(4.64)
Low 12.13
(5.24)
13.93
(4.46)
13.03
(4.95)
Hi gh 
♦ 
Low
11.77
(4.67)
12.80
(4.98)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Sou rce SS df MS F
C rea t i v i t y 16.01 1 16.01 .67
Intel1i gence 33.74 1 33.74 1.41
Interac tion 8.10 1 8.10 . 34
Within Cells 1343.00 56 23.98
* F .90 (l’56) - 2.78
was evidenced. Table 22 presents the intercorrelations 
between this control and those previously presented. Most 
of the correlations between equivalence range and the three 
previously presented controls were not significant. However,
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TABLE 22
Intercorrelations between Equivalence Range (number of 
groups) and Field Dependence-independence (FD-I), Con­
stricted-Flexible (C-F), and Focusing-Scanning A and B 
(F-SA & F-SB)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low H i gh + Low
FD-I 09 18 1 3
Hi gh C-F -10 36 11
F-SA -07 -01 -04
F-SB 26 19 20
INTELLIGENCE
FD-I -24 42 12
Low C-F 35 -61* 25
F-SA 13 23 48**
F-SB 48 09 17
Hi gh FD-I -13 36
C-F 10 -14
F-SA 02 02
F-SB 37 06
* .05 level of significance
** *01 level of significance
for LC-LI S_s there was a negative correlation between narrow 
equivalence range (high number of groups) and flexible cont­
rol which was significant beyond the .02 level. There was 
also a significant relationship for the LI S£ between scann­
ing (focusing-scanning A) and narrow equivalence range.
The means for the "number of singles" score and 
the analysis of variance for the four groups are presented 
in table 23.
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TABLE 23
Means for the Number of Singles Score on the Object Sorting
Test for the Four Groups (N«60)
CREATIVITY
High Low Hi gh Low
Hi gh 4.73 5.87 5. 30
(2.60) (5.18) (4.14)
INTELLIGENCE
Low 4.47 7. 30 6.23
(4.98) (6.19) (5.83)
Hi gh
♦ 4.70 6.83
Low (3.97) (5.79)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Sou rc e SS df MS F
Creativi ty 6 8 . 22 1 6 8 . 22 2.65
Intelligence 13.07 1 13.07 .51
Interaction 15.01 1 15.01 . 58
Within Cells 1439.00 56 25.70
* F >9Q (1,56) - 2.78
Table 23 demonstrates that the LC S_s tended to leave the 
largest number of objects ungrouped on the Object Sorting 
Test, with the LC-LI Sjs, as a group, leaving the most objects 
ungrouped. This effect for creativity in regard to the
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number of singles score was just short of significance at 
the .10 level. No other significant relationships were 
demonstrated by the analysis of variance.
The intercorrelations between the number of singles 
score and the previously presented cognitive controls of field 
dependence-independence, constricted-flexible, focusing-scan- 
ning A, focusing-scanning B and number of groups are present­
ed in table 24. The only relationship between the number of 
singles score and the aforementioned controls was with con­
stricted-flexible. The relationship indicated, beyond the 
.05 level of significance for the LC-HI Sjs, was that a high 
number of singles on the Object Sorting Test was negatively 
correlated with constricted control. That is to say, a high 
number of singles was associated with a low constricted score 
(toward the flexible end of the continuum).
The means and the analysis of variance for the 
score on the Band Width Test for the four groups was present­
ed in table 25. The results obtained demonstrated no sign­
ificant effects for either creativity or intelligence. The 
intercorrelations between band width and the four previously 
discussed controls are presented in table 26. Although no 
effect was demonstrated for creativity and intelligence in 
regard to band width, several significant correlation with 
other controls were obtained. First of all, for the LC-HI 
Ss, a relationship with number of singles significant beyond 
the .01 level was obtained. That is to say, among these S_s_
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TABLE 24
Intercorrelations between Number of Singles and Field
Dependence-independence (FD-I), Constricted-Flexible (C-F),
Focusing-Scanning A (F-SA), Focusing-Scanning B (F-SB),
and Equivalence Ran ge (E-R)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low High 4 Low
FD-I -29 -24 -27
C-F 32 -57* -17
Hi gh F-SA -24 -19 -22
F-SB -20 49 19
E-R 08 02 04
INTELLIGENCE
FD-I -17 12 08
C-F -04 -10 -10
Low F-SA -14 -14 -23
F-SB 00 18 -01
E-R 24 04 18
FD-I -19 05
Hi gh C-F 10 -34
4 F-SA -16 -21
Low F-SB -07 24
E-R 19 06
* .05 level of significance
there was a tendency for a h i gh number of singles on the
Object Sorting Test to be associated with broad band width
on the Category Wi d th Test. In addi t ion, a negative corr-
eltation between flexible control and band width was obtained. 
The number of singles score across HI (both HC and LC) corr­
elated with Band Width significantly; this relationship did 
not obtain for the LI Ss. An additional finding was that
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TABLE 25
Means on Band Width for the Four Groups (N-60)
CREATIVITY
High Low Hi gh ♦ Low
High 64.27 66.00 65.13
(10.51 ) (11.52) (11 .06)
INTELLIGENCE
Low 6 6 . 93 63.67 65.30
(8.21 ) (13.54) (11.32)
High
♦ 65.60 64.83
Low (9.52) (12.63)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source SS df MS F
C rea t i v i ty 8.82 1 8.82 .07
Intel 1igence .42 1 .42 .00
In teract i on 93.69 1 93.69 .71
Within Cells 7386.00 56 131.89
* F .90 (1’56)
00•
CMB
i
for the Lc Sjs as a group, there was a significant negative 
relationship between constricted-flexible and band width. 
The final finding for this test was a significant relation­
ship between band width and field independence for HI Ss. 
The implications of these several correlations with band
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TABLE 26
Intercorrelations between Band-Width and Field Dependence-
independence (FD-I), Constricted-Flexible (C-F), Focusing-
Scanning A (F-SA),.Focusing-Scanning B (F-SB), and Equi-
valence Range (E-R) and Numbe r of Singles (N of S)
CREATIVITY
High Low Hi gh 4 Low
FD-I -41 -41 -4 2*
C-F 14 -61* -19
High F-SA -24 -06 -17
F-SB -15 37 08
E-R 11 -41 -19
N of S-21 73** 43*
INTELLIGENCE
FD-I -08 44 18
C-F 04 -31 -16
Low F-SA -16 -47 -24
F-SB -18 -05 -03
E-R -53* 25 -09
N of S-47 12 -10
FD-I -25 08
Hi gh C-F 09 -42*
4 F-SA -23 -22
Low F-SB -18 13
E-R -19 -10
N of S-33 36
* .05 level of significance
** .01 level of significance
width is ambiguous since there is no distinction between the 
four groups on band width.
Tolerance for Ambiguity
The means and the analysis of variance for the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
trials of first response on the tolerance for ambiguity 
test for the four groups are presented in table 27. The 
analysis of variance demonstrated no significant relation­
ships between trial of first response and creativity or 
intel1 i genee.
The means and analysis of variance for the number 
of response changes on the tolerance for ambiguity for the 
four groups are presented in table 28. Once again, for 
this score on the tolerance for ambiguity test, no signifi­
cant effects were demonstrated for either creativity or 
intel 1 i gence.
The intercorrelations between tolerance for am­
biguity (trial of first response) and field dependence- 
independence, constricted-flexible, focus ing-scanning A, 
focusing-scanning B, equivalence-range (number of objects), 
number of singles, and band-width are presented in table 29. 
The only relationship evidenced between tolerance for 
ambiguity and the previous scores was with field independence 
for HI-LC Ss^  which was significant beyond the .01 level.
The HI-LC jS£ were the most field independent as a group and 
this was significantly (.01 level) correlated with their 
scores on the tolerance for ambiguity test.
Schematizing Test
The means for the "percentage ranking accuracy" 
score on the Schematizing test for the four groups are 
presented in table 30. For this score, a significant effect 
beyond the .10 level was obtained for intelligence: that is,
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TABLE 27
Means for Trials of First Response on Tolerance for Ambi­
guity for the Four Groups (N-60)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low H i gh + Low
High 1.97 1.80 1 .89
(1.17) (1.15) (1.16)
INTELLIGENCEJ f t l l  I w u b i t V l u i i V w
Low 1.70 2.87 1.94
(1.25) (1.28) (1.29)
High
♦ 1.84 1.99
Low (1 .2 2 ) (1.23)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source SS df MS F
Creat iv i ty .37 1 .37 .24
In tel 1 i gence .05 1 .05 .00
Interaction 1.63 1 1.63 1 .04
Within Cells 88.02 56 1.57
*F >9Q (1,56) - 2.78
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TABLE 28
The Means for 
Ambiguity for
Number of Response 
the Four Groups (N»
Changes on 
60)
Tolerance for
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low High + Low
High 9.40 
(5.59)
9.13
(3.12)
9.27
(4.53)
INTELLIGENCE
Low 9.93 
(4.68)
8.60
(6.39)
9.27
(5.64)
Hi gh 
♦ 9.67 
Low (5.17)
8.87
(5.03)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Sou rce SS df MS F
Creativi ty 9.64 1 9.64 . 35
Intel 1 i gence 4. 24 1 4.24 .15
Interaction .001 1 .00 .00
Within Cells 1544.00 56 27.57
*F #90 (1,56) - 2.78
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TABLE 29
Intercorrelations between Tolerance for Ambiguity (trials 
of first response) and Field Dependence-independence 
(FD-I), Constricted-Flexible (C-F), Focusing-Scanning A 
& B (F-SA & F-SB), Equivalence Range (E-R), Number of 
Singles ( No of S) and Band Width (B-W)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low Hi gh 4 Low
FD-I 07 70** 38
C-F 16 33 11
F-SA 08 -23 -04
High F-SB 37 -39 03
E-R 19 43 32
Nof S 10 01 03
B-W -22 -41 -32
INTELLIGENCE -----------
FD-I 13 -02 11
C-F -08 -40 -25
F-SA 28 02 05
Low F-SB -08 07 -07
E-R 03 32 19
Nof S -01 -43 -18
B-W 08 22 13
FD-I 12 29
C-F 06 -09
Hi gh F-SA 19 -15
+ F-SB 15 -1 5
Low E-R 09 40
Nof S 03 21
B-W -10 -06
** .01 level of significance
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TABLE 30
The Means for Percentage Ranking Accuracy on the Schema-
tizing Test for the Four Groups (N-60)
CREATIVITY 
H 1 gh Low
INTELLIGENCE
Hi gh + Low
Hi gh 48.6 7 34.60 41.63
(28.17 ) (23.04) (26.68)
Low 29.93 28.73 29. 33
(21.95) (21.46) (21.71)
High
♦ 39.30 31.67
Low (26.93) (22.46)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Sou rce SS df MS F
Crea tivi ty 880.50 1 880.50 1 .46
Intel 1 i gence 2270.00 1 2270.00 3.76*
Interac tion 619.00 1 619.00 1.01
Wi th in Cells 33790.00 56 603.39
*F #9Q (1,56) - 2.78
the HI S£ demonstrated greater ranking accuracy (sharpen­
ing) than did the LI Ss. There was no significant effect 
for creativity, although the HC-HI group demonstrated the
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most sharpening. The intercorrelations between this score 
and the previous ones are presented in table 31; very few 
significant correlations were found. Among LC-HI Sjj^, there 
was a negative correlation significant beyond the .05 level 
between band width and sharpening. In addition, for HI S_s 
there was a significant relationship between this score and 
the tolerance for ambiguity score. Turning to the mean 
percentage increment error score on the Schematizing test, 
table 32 presents the means for this score for the four 
group s.
For percentage increment error, a significant 
effect for creativity was obtained beyond the .05 level, 
and also a significant effect for intelligence was obtained 
beyond the .10 level. On this score, it was demonstrated 
that HC jSs tended to be sharpeners; among this HC group 
the HI Sj3 tended to be more sharpeners than the LI Ss. 
Conversely, LC-LI £s occupied the extreme end as levelers. 
The intercorrelations between percentage increment error 
and all previously discussed scores are presented in table 
33. The major result evidenced between this score and 
previous ones was an inverse relationship between percent­
age ranking accuracy and percentage increment error; both 
scores derived from the Schematizing Test. This finding 
was expected from the definition of the two scores. In 
addition, however, a positive relationship between 
leveling and band width was once again demonstrated for 
HI-LC Ss.
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TABLE 31
Intercorrelations between Level in g-Sharpenin g (percentage 
ranking accuracy) and Field Dependence-independence (FD-I), 
Constricted-Flexible (C-F), Focusing-Scanning A and B 
(F-SA & F-SB), Equivalence Range (E-R), Number of Singles 
(NofS), Band Width (B-W), and Tolerance for Ambiguity 
( TFA)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low H i gh + Low
FD-I 18 27 27
C-F -03 34 10
F-SA -21 -03 -0 5
High F-SB -31 -20 -17
E-R -12 24 06
NofS 07 -23 -14
B-W 00 -56* -27
TFA 34 45 39*
INTELLIGENCE
FD-I -10 -04 -08
C-F 48 14 18
F-SA -27 -22 -23
Low F-SB 40 -13 1 1
E-R 07 -29 -10
NofS 21 32 25
B-W -01 04 02
TFA -19 -41 -30
FD-I 10 03
C-F 17 27
F-SA -16 -0 7
Hi gh F-SB 03 -12
♦ E-R -04 -03
Low NofS 13 04
B-W -0 5 -23
TFA 13 -01
* .05 level of significance
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
TABLE 32
Means for Percentage Increment Error on the Schematizing
Test for the Four Groups (N-60)
CREATIVITY
High Low Hi gh + Low
Hi gh
INTELLIGENCE
Low
39.20
(17.25)
52. 33 
(19.11)
45.77
(19.36)
49.8 7 
(17.37)
56.40
(11.62)
53.13
(15.14)
Hi gh 
♦ 
Low
44. 53 
(18.12)
54.37
(15.95)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Sou rc e SS df MS F
C rea tiv i ty 1449.00 1 1449.00 4.95**
In tel 1igence 815.90 1 815.90 2.79*
In terac tion 160.10 1 160.10 . 55
Within Cells 16390.00 56 292.68
* F .90 (1,56) - 2.78
** F (1,56) - 4.02
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TABLE 33
Intercorrelations between Percentage Increment Error and 
Field Dependence-independence (FD-I), Constricted-Flexible 
(C-F), Focusing-Scanning A & B (F-SA & F-SB), Equivalence 
Range (E-R), Number of Singles (NofS), Band Width (B-W), 
Tolerance for Ambiguity (TFA), and Percentage Ranking 
Accuracy (PRA)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low Hi gh ♦ Low
FD-I -16 07 -15
C-F 14 -20 01
F-SA -34 -09 -29
High F-SB 03 -13 -14
E-R 31 07 17
NofS -09 37 25
B-W 49 38 43*
TFA -30 09 -11
INTELLIGENCE
PRA -36 -60* -52**
FD-I 00 17 14
C-F 27 05 31
F-SA 20 17 -21
F-SB -27 -2 5 -31
Low E-R -06 -18 -06
NofS -07 -47 -17
B-W -04 -29 -18
TFA 37 22 33
PRA -48 -21 -36
FD-I -12 12
C-F 16 -13
F-SA -14 -04
Hi gh F-SB -14 -20
♦ E-R 12 01
Low NofS -07 04
B-W 28 08
TFA 01 1 5
PRA -47** —46*
* .05 level of significance
**.01 level of significance
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In addition to the individual analysis performed 
for each control, a three-way analysis of variance with 
repeated measures was performed for creativity and intelli­
gence and eight cognitive control scores. The scores employ­
ed were a) total time (field dependence-independence); b)
CW-C (constricted-flexible); c & d) number of objects A and 
B (focusing-scanning); e) number of groups (equivalence 
range); f) band width; g) trial of first response (tolerance 
for ambiguity); and h) percentage ranking accuracy (leveling- 
sharpening). This analysis of variance is presented in 
table 34. Outside of the expected effect for cognitive 
controls, no significant effects for creativity or intell­
igence were indicated.
In regard to the additional scores obtained from 
the tests administered, they were not directly relevant to 
cognitive controls and thus are presented in Appendices G 
and H. Briefly, however, the results from these scores 
will be mentioned. From the Stroop test, three main time 
scores (W, C, CW) exhibited the same effect for intelligence 
as did the CW-C score; the CW score did reach significance 
at the .10 level. What was indicated was that the HI Ss, 
consistently (but not always significantly) took longer 
time to perform this task than did LI £s. For the complex- 
ive and thematic grouping scores on the Object Sorting test, 
significant effects were demonstrated beyond the .10 and .05 
levels, respectively. For complexive grouping, the HC £s
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TABLE 34
Analysis of Variance for Creativity, Intelligence and Cognitive 
Cont ro1s
Source SS df MS F
Between Subj. 2156027.80 31 69549.28
A (creativity) 18348.41 1 18348.41 .26
B (intelli gence) 19363.69 1 19363.69 .28
AB 179602.91 1 179602.91 2.59
Subj. w. groups 1938712.80 28 69239.74
(error between)
Within Subj. 122112170.00 448 27257.18
C (cognitive
controls) 106617170.00 7 15231024.29 58.41***
AC 161920.00 7 23139.99 .09
BC 206710.00 7 29530.00 .11
ABC 1240500.00 7 177214.28 .67
C x subj. w. groups 108226300.00 420 257681.67
*** F .99 <7 » 420> ” 2.64
1
0
6
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employed this category significantly more than did the LC 
Ss. while for the thematic grouping score the HI employed 
it more often than did the LI Ss. With regard to the rest 
of the scores computed, no significant relationships between 
either creativity or intelligence and any of the other 
cognitive control scores were demonstrated*
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Reliability Measures
In regard to the reliability measures for the 
tasks designed by the author, the correlations were fairly
high, especially for the scores 
would suggest confidence in the 
feature of cognitive behavior, 
procedures, the fat that even h 
in the main sample between focu 
this conclusion. For tolerance 
ination of the range of scores 
Ss responded on the first trial 
the task was too easy. Consequ 
correlations for this task were 
itself was non-discriminating.
Creativity and Intelligence Dim 
The findings for the 
that they were strongly interco 
ly as high as those reported by 
in both studies all correlation 
majority being above .80. Thes
108
of primary interest. This 
ir indication of a consistent 
For the focus ing-scanning 
igher correlations obtained 
sing-scanning A and B reaffirm 
for ambiguity however, exam-
indicates that most of the 
. This would suggest that 
ently, the test-retest
spu riou sly h i gh and the tas
ens ions
crea tivi ty measu res indi ca te
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the view that there is a consistent dimension of cognitive 
behavior upon which individuals may be distinguished. They 
also cut across a possible verbal vs. visual distinction, 
since Pattern Meanings correlated highly with Alternate Uses 
and Similarities. As stated previously (P. 69), the correl­
ations among the intelligence measures (although significant) 
were quite low. Consequently, any possible significant eff­
ects would be expected to be attentuated by the reduced 
validity of the IQ index score.
The intercorrelations between creativity and in­
telligence were generally non-significant and might appear 
to support Wallach and Kogan's (1965) conclusion that there 
is a distinction between the intelligent and creative modes 
of functioning, at least for the grade school population. 
However, the vocabulary test wich was the only test which 
correlated significantly with the creativity scores, was 
also the test which correlated most highly with the IQ index 
score. This finding was even more significant when con­
sidered in regard to the actual median split for creativity 
and intelligence, where the Ss tended to be grouped into 
HC-HI and LC-LI. Thus the expected relative orthogonality 
of intelligence and creativity was not borne out by the 
actual distribution of the Sjs obtained on the median split. 
This could be due to the inadequacy of the intelligence 
measures. However, an equally plausible interpretation is 
that the two measures are not orthogonal. Thus the evidence
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would not appear to support the position adopted by Wallach 
and Kogan (1965) - that there is a distinction between the 
intelligent and the creative inodes of cognitive functioning.
Expected Results Reconsidered
In this study, it was expected that the following 
relationships would obtain;
a) high creative-high intelligent Sfs would be the 
more field independent with the low creative-low intelligent 
Ss being the more field dependent;
b) for the cognitive control of constricted- 
flexible, it was proposed that no relationship to creativity 
and intelligence would be demonstrated;
c) the high creative-high intelligent S_s would 
occupy the focusing end and the low creative-low intelligent 
Ss the scanning end of the continuum;
d) the high creative Ss_ would be characterized by 
tolerance for ambiguity;
e) for the cognitive control of equivalence range, 
it was predicted that no relationship to creativity and 
intelligence would be obtained;
f) the high creative Ss_ would be characterized by 
sha rpen i n g.
With these postulated results in mind, each control will be 
considered in turn.
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Field Dependence-independence
The implication from the theoretical delineation 
of field dependence-independence (p. 20) was that field 
independence was basically the more adaptive end of the 
continuum. Consequently, it was postulated that field 
independence would be characteristic of creative Sjs. How­
ever, the expectation for this control was essentially not 
confirmed. The most field independent S_s (achieving the 
lowest scores on the Embedded Figures Test) tended to be 
the LC-HI S_s rather than the HC Ss. The Ss_ most expected 
to be field independent, i.e., the HC-HI Ss_, tended to fall 
in the middle range of the continuum. The LC-LI Sjs were 
the only ones which tended to be field dependent in this 
study. There was a significant interaction for creativity 
and intelligence on field dependence-independence, but it 
was difficult to interpret. In this study, the test did 
not discriminate between high and low creative Ss.
Constricted-Flexible
It was predicted initially (p. 48) that this 
control would not distinguish between HC and LC Sjs since 
both ends of the continuum can be adaptive for creative 
modes of functioning. The results obtained confirmed this 
hypothesis. In fact, the means for the CW-C scores on the 
Stroop Colour-Word Test for these two groups were essential­
ly identical. There was, however, a slight tendency for 
the HI Ss to be more constricted (longer time scores) than
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the LI jSs. In terms of Klein's conception of this control,
HI Ss^ , more than LI Ss^ , would be characterized by greater 
efforts to keep judgments in line with external sources of 
informat ion.
Focusing-Scanning
The basic theoretical position adopted in regard 
to this control was that efficiency in deployment of atten­
tion (focusing) would result in more information being 
received. In addition, it was postulated, on theoretical 
grounds, that creative Ss_ would be more open to the environ­
ment and more active in perusing the environment. Consequent­
ly, it was expected that creative Sjs would demonstrate the 
focusing end of the continuum. This was confirmed at a 
high level of confidences It was found that the high creat­
ive-high intelligent Sjs were focusers and that the low 
creative-low intelligent S_s were scanners.
In addition to the major hypothesis above, it 
was contended (p. 57) that focus ing-scanning B would dis­
criminate less clearly between these two creativity groups 
than would focus ing-scanning A. The reasoning was that for 
focusing-scanning B, with the narrow array of objects, 
systematic attention would be less crucial. It was found 
that on both focusing-scanning A and B (on the number of 
objects recounted score) the high creative Ss^  were signifi­
cantly more efficient, i.e. able to recount more objects. 
However, on the differential scores which assigned more
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weight to objects on the periphery, this effect was less 
significant for f ocus i n g-scann i n g B. On this test, the 
objects were tightly bunched and could almost be taken in 
at a glance. With the wide spread array on focus in g-scanni n g 
A, however, an individual had to be more systematic to per­
ceive all the objects in the time allowed. Consequently, 
the operation of the focusing end of this control was not 
as crucial on the focusing-scanning B as on focusing-scann- 
ing A. The finding of a less significant relationship for 
the former test supported this argument.
Equivalence Range
For this control, it was predicted that no 
distinction within creativity would be evidenced since 
either end of the continuum could be facilitative of creative 
functioning. This was confirmed; there was no significant 
effect for creativity. There was also no significant effect 
for intelligence in relation to this control. These findings 
were confirmed not only for the score of primary interest,
i.e. number of objects score, but also for the number of 
singles score on the Object Sorting Test and the band width 
score on the Ca te go ry-Wi dth Test.
Tolerance for Ambiguity
It was expected that this control would be crucial 
in distinguishing between high and low creative jis^  since 
tolerance for ambiguity involves a freedom to accept ideas
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that deviate from the conventional (and of which the tend­
ency to premature closure is a crucial aspect). Thus, it 
was predicated that the high creative would tend to be 
more tolerant of ambiguity than the LC S[s. This expectation 
was not confirmed and little relationship to other controls 
was demonstrated. From these results, two conclusions could 
be drawn: a) either it is not relevant to the creative proc­
ess, or b) the test does not assess what it was intended to 
measures As mentioned previously (p. 105) the evidence 
suggests that the test was, indeed, non-discriminating.
Leveling-Sharpening
The theoretical delineation of this control 
stressed that the assimilation of successive stimuli (level­
ing) leads to stereotyping which is antithetical to creative 
functioning. Consequently, it was suggested that creative 
Ss would be characterized by sharpening - i.e., able to 
keep successive stimuli distinct. In regard to this 
expected results, the findings obtained were somewhat con­
flicting. On the percentage ranking accuracy score on the 
Schematizing test, there was no significant effect for 
creativity, although there was one for intelligence. Thus 
the HC-HI and the LC-HI groups were the sharpeners. However, 
a significant effect for creativity was obtained for the 
percentage increment error score. On the basis of this 
score, the HC Ss_ tended to be the sharpeners and the LC j>s^ 
the levelers.
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Having summarized the findings regarding each 
control, the implications in terms of characteristics of 
cognitive behavior for the four groups can not be consider­
ed. The HC-HI and then the LC-LI groups will be considered 
first since this was the actual median plit obtained and 
the most basic distinction.
The HC-HI £s were found to be most clearly focus- 
ers and sharpeners, but also occupied the middle range on 
field dependence-indpendence and tended to be slightly 
constricted. On this basis, they might be said to be a) 
efficient in acquiring information from the environment 
when that is demanded of them; b) able to keep successive 
stimul distinct; c) fairly able to separate an item from 
its context; and, d) somewhat concerned with keeping judg­
ments in line with external sources of information. The 
characteristics just outlined appear to suggest a highly 
adaptive mode of encounter with the environment. These 
controls suggest the ability to readily "accommoda te", in 
Piaget's definition of the term. However, it is suggested 
here that since these Ss_ were not extreme on the field 
dependence-independence and constricted-flexible controls, 
they are not bound to accommodation and thus can "assimilate" 
at will. In other words, it is felt that this finding 
generally supports the position adopted: that the creative 
process is characterized by the' ability to move freely 
between assimilation and accommodation. In line with the 
concept of equilibrium mentioned previously (p. 2), the
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creative process would thus be characterized by a flexible 
and stable equilibrium in which assimilation and accommodat­
ion predominate as the situation demands. The adaptive 
functioning of the non-creative individual could thus be 
characterized as a rigid equilibrium.
Turning to the LC-LI group, the control features 
demonstrated were field dependence, flexibility, scanning 
and leveling. These Sjs could thus be described as a) unable 
to keep an item separate from its context; b) ignoring 
competing and conflicting elements; c) inefficient in 
surveying their stimulus field; and, d) assimilating succ­
essive elements to each other. In contrast to the HC-HI 
group, these Shs appear to be unable to accommodate adequate­
ly to the demands of external objects. They tend to ass­
imilate predominantly and can not always accommodate when 
the situation demands.
Turning to the HC-LI jSs, as might be expected, 
the results are somewhat conflicting. In terms of their 
performance on the controls, they appear to be character­
ized by field independence, focusing, and leveling on one 
score but in the middle range on another. The first two 
controls would describe them as able to keep an item 
separate from its context, and efficient in acquiring in­
formation from the environment, thus in this respect being 
similar to the HC-HI group. However, the tendency to be 
levelers suggests that this group is more strongly influ­
enced by a situation which encourages assimilation (Schema­
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tizing test) - they appear as less able to keep successive 
stimuli distinct. This suggests reduced ability to move 
between assimilation and accommodation. However, since the 
1 eveling-sharpening control appears to be in part a function 
of intelligence, it is suggested that the findings offer 
preliminary support for the hypothesis that creativity is 
subsumed under a general intelligence factor.
The LC-HI :Ss were found to be characterized by 
field independence and scanning. As a group they appear 
characterized by the ability to keep an item separate from 
its context, but they inadequately survey the information 
contained in their environment. These Ss_ would appear to 
be concerned with accurate perception but not able to handle 
diverse elements and thus assimilate stimuli rather than 
deal with conflicting information. It is suggested here 
that for these Ss, the equilibrium between assimilation and 
accommodation is too rigid and the flexible adaptation to 
one's environment as is required for creative functioning 
is thus rendered difficult.
In general the distinction between high creative 
and low creative Ss^  has been portrayed above as involving 
stability and instability of equilibrium. A stable equil­
ibrium, thus, delineates the ability of the individual to 
move between assimilation and accommodation in his encounter 
with the world of objects. Perhaps further light can be 
shed on this process when it is viewed from the perspective
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of Schachtel's conception of secondary autocentric and alio- 
centric perception. The basic and most important distinction 
between these two modes of perception is the openness with 
which an individual perceives the objects of his experience, 
or the lack thereof. In secondary autocentric perception, 
the perspective from which an individual perceives objects 
is narrowed and closed such that his experience of objects 
is only from the perspective of his particular social group. 
This perception is truly convergent in Guilford's conception 
of the term.
Allocentric perception, on the other hand, involves 
an openness to the world such that it is possible for the 
individual to perceive many more objects and more variegated 
aspects of these objects. Only when one's perspectives are 
thus broadened to perceive many objects is creativity poss­
ible.
The importance of this exposition for the present 
study is that the cognitive controls that characterize the 
HC-HI Sjs seem also descriptive of allocentric perception.
As a group, these Ss^  appear more able to perceive objects 
veridically than for example, the LC-LI Sjs. The two most 
relevant control characteristics would appear to be focusing 
and sharpening. That is, these Ss, are more able to perceive 
a variety of objects in the environment and also more able 
to keep a succession of object perceptions distinct.
On the other hand, the characteristics of the
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LC-LI Sjs (p. 114) suggest what is described as secondary 
autocentric perception. These Sjs are unable to perceive 
an object as it is, but rather tend to confuse it with its 
context, ignore conflicting elements, or assimilate it to 
previous perceptions.
In regard to the HC-LI group, they did not appear 
able to preceive consistently in an allocentric fashion. What 
seems involved is that a basic level of intelligence is 
required. Below this minimum Ss_ are only able to perceive 
the conventional aspects of an object. Possibly, when the 
stimulus situation is simple, these _Ss would be expected to 
perceive in an allocentric fashion. However, as the stimuli 
become more complex, they must increasingly fall back on 
conventional structures.
The dominance of scanning in the LC-HI group 
suggests that these survey inadequately the information
from the environment. They are also intelligent enough to 
perceive quickly the most accepted point of view. They are 
however, not able to look any further. In contra-distinction 
to the HC-LI S_s, it is not that allocentric perception is 
beyond their basic intellectual capacity. These S^ s remain 
at the secondary autocentric level of perception for reasons 
other than intellectual capacity, such as for example, needs 
or problems of adjustment etc. It is for these reasons then 
that they are described as being unable to go beyond the 
conventional, accepted point of view.
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The limitations of this study and proposals for 
continued research. This investigation was primarily an 
exploratory one, intended to examine the relevance of cogn­
itive controls (consistent patterns of cognitive behavior) 
to creative thinking. As such, it has two primary deficits: 
a) insufficient range and b) insufficient number of Sjs. The 
former refers to the point that the sample was too homogen­
eous. These two deficits undoubtedly played a large role 
in the low correlations obtained. However, an increase of 
Ss alone would not necessarily result in a more heterogen­
eous sample. What is undoubtedly needed before any clear 
conclusions can be drawn in regard to the interrelationships 
of creativity, intelligence and cognitive controls, is a 
major study cutting across such selection factors as age, 
sex and socio-economic status.
A limitation, in this latter regard, is the 
nature of the criterion tests adopted for intelligence and 
creativity. Both groups of tests depend heavily on verbal 
fluency. Thus the tasks themselves were biased in favour 
of middle class children. Children from a lower socioeconomic 
level could be severely handicapped simply because of in­
sufficient verbal skills. Thus the range of applicability 
of this study is limited, reinforcing the need for a study 
cutting across socioeconomic status.
An additional major deficit in this investigation 
was the intelligence measures chosen. The correlations 
obtained (p. 69) do not warrant confidence in accepting the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
IQ index score obtained as a valid measure of intelligence. 
This would appear to be a major source of error and a likely 
consequence would be an obscuring of the true picture. Con­
sequently, any further investigation should involve a larger 
and more diverse number of measures of intelligence.
In regard to the measures adopted for the cogni­
tive control measures, several lines of investigation sugg­
est themselves. Although the Embedded Figures Test (field 
dependence-independence) , the Object Sorting Test (equi­
valence range) and the Schematizing test (1eveling-sharpen- 
ing) appear fairly clearly delineated, the picture in regard 
to the other three tests appears less clear, and considerable 
uncertainty remains as to their usefullness. Although the 
main time scores for the Stroop Colour-Word Test (W, C, CW) 
appear fairly stable (see p. 56), the derived score (CW-C) 
for constricted-flexible, in an extensive investigation 
(Jensen, 1965), did not produce high reliabilities and its 
continued employment is of dubious value.
For the tolerance for ambiguity task, the major 
correction that it was felt this investigation suggested 
was that the successive increase in stimulus value of the 
cards must be more rigidly controlled, thus yielding sets 
of cards of equal difficulty. The technique employed by 
Multari (1961), i.e. photographing a picture with the ob­
jective moved successively out of fucus suggests itself as 
a possible appraoch. In any case, the theoretical delinea­
tion in chapter one (see pp. 35-38) suggests that this
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variable is crucial and consequently any future study must 
first of all establish some valid measure for this control.
The most promising indication for future research 
comes from the focusing-scanning task. This test yielded 
the most significant results and appears to touch upon a 
crucial aspect of an individual's encounter with his environ­
ment.
The form of this test which would most directly 
measure this control would involve some kind of apparatus 
through which the S's eye movements could be tracked. In 
addition, this study suggests that the extent of the array 
of objects (size and number involved) is also a crucial 
element. Thus, one possible line of investigation would 
be alternate forms of the test in which the number of objects 
would be varied.
The test could also take the form of actual ob­
jects, slides projected on a screen, or a three-dimensional 
array. All these areas should be investigated to establish 
the generality of this control, and also the most fruitful 
measure of it.
From the author's point of view, the course that 
would seem best to follow at first would be an apparatus 
which would permit the experimenter to photograph or track 
the S's eye movements while the £> was looking at various 
slides which could be varied as to number and spread of the 
objects. Possible relations to 1eveling-sharpening also
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the _S looks at and later 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study was concerned with a) the individual's 
encounter with his environment and b) the dimensions organ­
izing this encounter. The theoretical perspective adopted 
was Piaget's conception of intelligence as involving adap­
tation and organization. The modes of the individual's 
adaptation considered were intelligence and creativity, 
while the dimensions organizing this encounter were the 
cognitive controls of field dependence-independence, con­
stricted-flexible, focusing-scanning, tolerance for ambi­
guity, equivalence range, and leveling-sharpening. It was 
hypothesized that a) high creative Ss_ would be characterized, 
in the extreme, by the following cognitive controls: 
field independence, tolerance for ambiguity, and scanning; 
and b) no distinction would be demonstrated between high 
and low creative Sjs on the following cognitive controls: 
constricted-flexible, equivalence range, and leveling- 
sharpening.
The sample consisted of 60 boys from the fifth 
grade of elementary school. They were administered three 
measures of intelligence and three of creativity, and eight 
tests for cognitive controls: Embedded Figures Test, Stroop
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Colour-Word Test, Object Sorting Test, Ca te go ry-Wi d th Test, 
Schematizing Test and two tests designed by the author for 
f ocusin g-scannin g and tolerance for ambiguity. The Ss^  were 
split into high and low on creativity and within each group 
they were further subdivided into high and low on intelli­
gence, thus yielding a 2 x 2 contingency table with 15 Ss^  
per cell. Within each cell, the means, standard deviations 
were computed and an analysis of variance for each control 
was calculated.
The statistical analysis revealed that the hypo­
theses were confirmed in regard to the controls of focus­
ing, constricted-flexible and equivalence range. That is, 
the high creative £s_ tended to be focusers and the low 
creative jSs scanners and that the controls of constricted- 
flexible and equivalence range did not discriminate between 
these two groups of S_s. However, contrary to expectation, 
field independence and tolerance for ambiguity did not 
distinguish between high and low creative Ss. In regard to 
tolerance for ambiguity, however, the results were spurious 
since the test did not adequately assess this control. For 
leveling-sharpening, the results were conflicting, but there 
were indications that the high creative Sjs tended to be 
sharpeners and the low creative S>£ levelers.
In conclusion, it is felt that this study has 
indicated some important features of the creative process 
in the obtained tendency for creative Ss to be focusers
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(efficient in surveying the information contained in a 
stimulus field) and sharpeners (able to keep stimuli distinct). 
It is also felt that continued research on this area is 
warranted, particularly with a wide range of !Ss taking into 
account such selection factors as age, sex, education and 
socio-economic level.
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APPENDIX A
Creativity Tasks
AlternateUses
1. Tell me all the different ways you could use a news­
paper,
2. Tell me all the different ways you could use a knife.
3. Tell me all the different ways you could use an auto­
mobile tire - either the tube of the outer part,
4. Tell me all the different ways you could use a cork,
5. Tell me all the different ways you could use a shoe.
6. Tell me all the different ways you could use a button
the kind that is used on clothing.
7. Tell me all the different ways you could use a key -
the kind that is used in doors.
8. Tell me all the different ways you could use a chair.
Similarities
1. Tell me all the ways in which a potato and a carrot
arealike.
2. Tell me all the ways in which a cat and a mouse are
alike.
3. Tell me all the ways in which a train and a tractor
are alike.
4. Tell me all the ways in which milk and meat are alike,
5. Tell me all the ways in which a grocery store and a
restaurant are alike.
6. Tell me all the ways in which a violin and a piano
a re alike.
7. Tell me all the ways in which a radio and a telephone
are alike.
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8. Tell me all the ways in which a watch and a typewriter 
are alike.
9. Tell me all the ways in which a curtain and a rug are 
a 1 i ke •
10. Tell me all the ways in which a desk and a table are 
alike.
Pattern Meanings
Example Card
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a p p e n d i x  b
Instructions for Creativity Tasks
You are asked to evaluate the responses on the basis of the 
following three categories:
a) uniqueness
b) appropriateness
c) transformation
For the first two categories the judgment will be all or 
nothing, that is the response is given either a score of 1 
o r 0.
Uniqueness
Uniqueness is defined only in reference to the to 
“tal reponses of this sample.
A score of 0 is given for any response which has 
been given to the same item by more than one S_. You will 
also have to decide on the equivalence of similar responses 
Equivalent responses are not judged unique and within one 
S_'s responses to one item, equivalent responses are assess­
ed as one response. For example, on the "Alternate Uses" - 
in response to "Tell me all the different ways in which you 
can use a newspaper*", any response that implies "read" is 
equivalent to "read" and is thus only scored once.
A score of 1 is given to any response which is 
given by only one S_; that is, it occurs only once in res­
ponse to any question and is not equivalent to any other 
response.
A d p rop riateness
A score of 0 is assigned to any response which is 
judged inappropriate or arbitrary in terms of the question 
asked. Unusualness of usuage is not a question but only 
whether the object can be used as described - in which case 
it is given a score of 1. To be appropriate, a response 
on the Pattern Meanings must include all the lines on the 
card.
Transformation
The final category is concerned with products
i ?;»
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that are considered to be both unusual and appropriate but 
which vary in terms of their level of creative excellence.
To take this aspect into consideration you will have to 
judge the Ss' responses in terms of their transcendence of 
conventional restraints. Only those responses which were 
judged unique and appropriate are considered for this cate­
gory.
Responses in this category must involve a trans­
formation of material or ideas to overcome conventional 
constraints.
The transformation power of a response is judged 
relative to the strength and nature of the constraints that 
are transcended. Transformation involves more than just 
unusualness, it involves a radical shift in approach to a 
subject or in handling the material. Thus, for example, on 
the Pattern Meanings transformations are not merely improve­
ments on the existing drawings - rather, they involve the 
creation of new forms which include the exisitng drawings 
as a relevant detail. On this basis, a response is given 
a score of 1, 2, or 3.
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APPENDIX C
Instructions for Object Sorting Test
The scoring for this test is divided into two 
main cate go ries.
The first category considers the bases on which 
the pictures are judged to be the "same", Five modes can 
be distinguished: perceptible, functional, affective, 
nominal and fiat equivalence.
1) Perceptible : The child may render the items equivalent
on the basis of immediate phenomenal qualities such as 
colour, size, shape or on the basis of position in time or 
space.
Perceptible Intrinsic They are . (Adj ec t iv e
". . . both yellow.")
They have . (Noun :
"... writing on them.") 
Perceptible Extrinsic They are (preposition)
(position in time or space: 
"... all in a house).
2) Func ti onal : The child may base equivalence on the use or 
function of the items, considering either what they do or 
what can be done to them.
Functional Intrinsic Th e y (Verb"
"... make noise.11)
Functional Extrinsic You them. (Verb
"... can tu rn th em on . )
3) Affective : The child may render the items equivalent on
the basis of the emotion they arouse or of his evaluation of 
th em.
Affective You _________ them. (Value or internal
state: "like them both.")
They are   ___. (Adjective indicat­
ing value:_"... very important.")
4) Nominal : The child may group the items by giving a name
that exists ready-made in the language.
Nominal They are (or are not) ________. (Noun:
"... both fruit.")
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5) Fiat Equivalence: The child may merely state that the
items are alike or are the same without giving any further 
information as to the basis of his grouping, even when he 
i s prodde d.
Fiat Equivalence ’’A 1' is (or is not) "B" (Like,
similar to, the same as, and 
so forth: "They are the same 
thing, really,")
The second category is according to the structure 
or syntax of the groupings formed. Three general grouping; 
structures are distinguished: superordinate, complexive and 
thematic.
1) Superordinate groupings 
a common feature character! 
group or class. Any array 
characteristics, any one or 
as the criterion for their 
example, banana, peach and 
ordinate grouping because, 
are all food", or because, 
store", and so forth.
are constructed on the basis of 
zing the items included in a g 
of items has a number of common 
combination of which can serve 
inclusion in a group. Thus, for 
potato can be placed in a super- 
"They all have skins", or "they 
"they all can be bought at a
General
Superordinate
This construction consists of 
stating a common characteristic of 
the items in the group. For example, 
bell and horn are "both things 
that make noise".
Itemi zed
Su p e ro rd i na t e
Itemization may be added to super­
ordinate groupings such that, while 
the items have a generalized pro­
perty that joins them, the basis 
on which each item qualifies is ex­
plicitly stated. For example,
"Bell makes noise, horn makes noise 
too, bell says ding-dong, horn says 
doo-doo.
2) Coinp 1 exive structures are formed by using attributes of 
an array so as to form local rather than universal rules for 
grouping. This general pattern is ullustrated by five man­
euvers for forming complexes:
Collections
ted properties that all
The complex consists of find­
ing comp 1 ementary or somehow 
contrasting or otherwise rela­
things have, but not in tying them
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together in terms of attributes that are shared. For exam­
ple, "Bell is black, horn is brown, telephone is blue, radio 
is red." Or, "newspaper you can read, book you can read, 
telephone you get messages over, radio you get messages over, 
and horn you can blow".
Edge Matchings This complex consists in form­
ing associative links between 
neighboring items. A chain 
of items is formed by tying the items together in linked 
pairs. For example, "Banana and peach are both yellow, 
peach and potato are both round, potato and meat are served 
together, milk and meat both come from cows." There is no 
consistency in the attribute or characteristic by which one 
link of the chain is joined with the one that precedes and 
the one that follows.
Key Rings The key-ring complex consists
in taking an item and linking 
all the others to it by 
choosing attributes that form relations between the central 
item and each of the others. For example, "Painting - well, 
one thing is a newspaper has got some painting on it, a book 
has got some black printing on it, a radio and a telephone 
have painting on them and a horn - well, there's a little 
painting on it, and a bell is also the colour of paints."
Or, "germs are in bananas, peach, potato, meat, milk, water 
and air".
Associations In the associations comp lex
the child links two items and 
then uses the bond between 
these items as a nucleus for adding other items. For exam­
ple, "Bell and horn are music things, when you dial a tele­
phone it's music a little". Or, "Bell, horn, telephone and 
radio make noises, if you fold back a newspaper, then it 
will crackle and make a noise."
Multiple Groupings This complex consists of the
formation of several sub­
groupings. For example,
"a telephone is like a radio - I know that. A horn and a 
bell make sounds, but I don't know about a newspaper". The 
list is thus segmented into several groups, and the gaps 
between them are not bridged.
Th ema t i c groupings are formed on the basis of how the
itmes fit in a sentence or story of a thema. The construc­
tion of the thematic groupings, in fact, most often depends 
on a sentence for tying items together. The sentence car­
ries the story or thematic line: "The little boy was eating
a bar ar.;. on the way to the store to buy some peaches and
potatoes".
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX D
Ca tegory~Width Test
1 ) Mo s t birds 
a ) How
b ) H o w
fly at the speed of about 17 miles per hour, 
fast does the fastest bird fly?
1. 30 miles per hour
2. 21 miles per hour
3. 60 miles per hour
4. 18 miles per hour
slow does the slowest bird fly?
1. 15 miles per hour
2. 5 miles per hour
3. 10 miles per hour
4. 2 miles per hour
2) Most whales are
a ) How long
1 . 
2 .
3.
4.
b ) How short
1 . 
2 .
3.
4.
about 65 feet long, 
is the longest whale?
69 feet 
150 feet 
7 6 feet 
9 0 feet 
is the shortest 
37 feet 
8 feet 
51 feet 
58 feet
whale ?
3) Usually
day.
a )
about 58 ships arrive in New York harbour every
Wh a t 
ever 
day ?
b)
do
to
Wh a t 
ever 
day?
do
to
you guess is the largest number of ships 
arrive in New York city harbour in one
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
you
102
6 5
7 4 
6 0 
guess
sh ips 
sh i p s 
ships 
sh ips 
i s the smallest number of ship
arrive in New York city harbour in one
1 . 
2 .
3.
4.
5
49
38
18
ships
ships
ships
ships
4) Most dogs are about 3 1/2 feet
a) How7 long is the longest
1. 4 1/2 feet
2. 4 feet
3. 5 1/2 feet
4. 6 1/2 feet
1 on g, 
dog?
1 38
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b) How short is the shortest dog?
1. 1 foot
2. 1/2 foot
3. 2 1/2 feet
4. 2 feet
5) Most cars are able to go about 90 miles per hour.
a )  How fast will the fastest car go?
1. 213 miles per hour
2. 95 miles per hour
3. 394 miles per hour
4. 132 miles per hour
b) How slow will the slowest car go?
1. 3 miles per hour
2. 18 miles per hour
3. 9 miles per hour
4. 1/2 mile per hour
are about 18 feet wide.
wide is the widest road?
1. 51 feet
2. 27 feet
3. 20 feet
4. 36 feet
narrow i s the narrowest
1. 16 feet
2. 7 feet
3. 2 feet
4. 11 feet
7) Most states have about 4 mi11ion . peop1e in them.
a) How many million people are there in the largest 
state?
1. 5 million
2. 15 million
3. 8 million
4. 30 million
b) How many million people are there in the smallest 
state?
1. 1 million 
2 . 2  million
3. 1/8 million
4. 3 million
8) Most buildings are about 50 feet high.
a) How high is the tallest building?
1. 421 feet
2. 1253 feet
3. 157 feet
4. 63 feet
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b) How short is the shortest building?
1. 40 feet
2. 6 feet
3. 29 feet
b)
4. 17 feet
?s a re about 34 inches wide.
wide is the widest window?
1. 110 inches
2. 36 inches
3. 43 inches
4. 57 inches
na rrow i s the narrowest window?
1. 3 i nch e s
2. 21 i nch es
3. 12 inches
4. 28 inches
10) Most sailboats go about 9 miles per hour.
a) How fast will the fastest sailboat go'
1. 22 miles per hour
2. 39 miles per hour
3. 11 miles per hour
4. 14 miles per hour
b) How slow will the slowest sailboat go'
1. 7 miles per hour
2. 8 1/2 miles per hour
3. 6 miles per hour
4. 4 1/2 miles per hour
U ) Eve ry 
a)
b)
year about 300 new schoolbooks are written, 
What is the largest number of schoolbooks 
written in one year?
1 . 5 2 4  books
2. 330 books
3. 392 books
4. 980 books 
th e sma11e s t 
in one year?
1. 94 books
2. 25 books
3. 9 books
4. 180 books
Wh a t is 
wri tten
number of schoolbooks
12) Most people spend about 
eating meals.
a) What is the longest time 
meals in a whole day?
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
55 minutes out of a whole day 
anyone spends eating
60 minutes 
105 minutes 
240 minutes 
73 minutes
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b) What is the shortest time anyone spends eating 
meals in a whole day?
1. 3 mi nu tes
2. 29 minutes
3. 47 minutes
4. 11 minu tes
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APPENDIX E
Tolerance for Ambiguity Test - Series F: Giraffe
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APPENDIX F
Instructions for Creativity & Cognition Tasks 
A1ternate Uses
Now, in this game, I am going to name an object - 
any kind of object, like a light bulb or the floor, - and 
it will be your job to tell me lots of different ways that
the object could be used. Any object can be used in a lot
of different ways. For example, think about string. What 
are some of the ways you can think of that you might use 
string. (The experimenter lets the child try.) Yes, those 
are fine. I was thinking that you could use string to
attach to a fish hook, to jump rope, to sew with, to hang
clothes on, and to pull shades. (The experimenter varies 
his suggestions so as not to duplicate any the child has 
provided.) There are lots more too, and yours were very 
good examples. I can see that you already understand how 
we play this game. So let’s begin now. And remember, think 
of all the different ways you could use the object that I 
name. Here we go.
Similarities
In this game I am going to name two objects, and 
I will want you to think of all the ways that these two ob­
jects are alike. I might name any two objects - like door 
and chair. But whatever I say, it will be your job to 
think of all the ways that the two objects are alike. For 
example, tell me all the ways that an apple and an orange 
are alike. (The child then responds.) That’s very good. 
You've already said a lot of things that I was thinking of.
I guess you could also say that they are both round, and 
they are both sweet. They both have seeds; they both are 
fruits; they both have skins; they both grow on trees - 
things like that. Yours were very fine too. (The experi­
menter's suggestions are varied so as not to include any 
which the child has given.) Do you see how we play the game 
(If the child indicates clear understanding already, the 
last sentence is replaced by - I can see that you already 
know how to play this game.) Well, let's begin now, and 
remember, each time I name two objects, you name as many 
ways as you can that these two objects are alike.
Pattern Meanings
Here's a game where you can really feel free to 
use your imagination. In this game I am going to show you 
some drawings. After looking at each one, I want you to
147
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tell me all the things you think each complete drawing can 
be. Here is an example - you can turn it any way you'd 
like to. (The experimenter gives the example card to the 
child.) What could this be? (The child is encouaged to 
try some suggestions.) Yes, those are fine. Some other 
kinds of things I was thinking of were the rising sun, a 
porcupine, eyelashes, a brush, a carnation, and probably 
there are lots of other things too. And yours were very 
good examples too. (The experimenter's particular sugges­
tions a re varied so as not to include any given by the 
child.) I can see that you already know how we play this 
game. So let's begin now.
Embedded Figures Test
We have another game to play now And it is like
one in the Sunday papers where, for example, a hidden animal
must be found in a picture.
(present P-l for 15 seconds) Does this remind 
you of anything.
(present P for 10 seconds) Learn this figure 
carefully because you will have to find it in the figure 
you just looked at.
(present P-l) Locate the simple figure.
(When S_ locates it - have him trace it with a finger.)
This is the way the game will be played. I will
show you a complex figure and then the simple figure. You
will have to find the simple figure in the complex one.
The simple figure will always be present in the complicated 
one and will always be right side up. If you forget the 
simple figure, you may ask to see it again (in which case 
turn over the complex figure and stop the clock, but do not 
return it to zero.) There may be some additional lines 
crossing the simple figure when it is in the complex figure.
Stroop Colour-Word Test
W Card
This page consists of names of colours. I'd like 
you to read the page out loud as fast and as accurately as 
you can, For instance, read this top line (the JS reads the 
practice line). Nov?, when I turn the page, start reading 
as fast and as accurately as possible.
C Ca r d
Nov? I am going to show you another page consist­
ing of colours. I want you to name the colours as fast and 
as accurately as possible. To make sure that you have the 
colour names correct, read the practice line. Now when I 
give the signal, start reading as accurately and as fast as 
p o s s i L , e .
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C-W Card
This is a different kind of page. It consists 
of colour names surrounded by different colours. For in­
stance, the word red may be surrounded by the colour blue; 
you are to read the colour and ignore the word. I want you 
to read the colours off as fast and as accurately as poss­
ible. Try the practice line. Now remember, at my signal 
read the colours off as quickly and as accurately as poss­
ible, ignoring the words.
Focusing-Scanning
I have a game here that I want you to play for 
me. I am going to show you a group of objects that are 
spread out under this cloth. You will look at them for 15 
seconds. Then I will cover them up again and I want you 
\ to tell me as many as you can.
Object Sorting Test
Now let's play the picture game. While I spread 
these pictures out for you I'll name them off so that we 
will be sure to agree on what each object is. (The experi­
menter sets down five rows of ten pictures each before the
_S , naming each as it is put down. The same initial arrange­
ment is used for each child.) Now your job is to look the
pictures over and then put all the pictures that seem to be­
long together in groups. The groups may be large or small, 
any size you want as long as the pictures in each group be­
long together for a reason. There aren't any right or 
wrong answers in this game. Every time I play it with some­
one the groups turn out differently. So you see, any way 
you feel like making the groups is fine, as long as you have 
some reason for it. Once you make the groups you can add 
to them or change them, and if there are any pictures left 
over at the end that don't seem to fit into any of your 
groups, you can just leave them separately. Do you see how 
we play the game? Good. Now take your time, there's no 
need to hurry. And remember that your groups can be all 
different sizes, OK, go ahead.
Cate gory-Width Test
This game asks you to guess about a lot of things 
in our world. For instance, if you knew that most grown-up 
men in the world are around 5 feet 7 inches tall, you might 
guess that the tallest man in the world is 7 feet tall or 8 
feet tall. And you might guess that the shortest man in the 
world is 4 feet tall or only 3 feet tall. In this game you 
get a chance to guess about things like that. Why don't 
you begin reading now, and circle your guesses for each of 
the th rtgs printed below. Take your time, and ask me any
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questions you want about things that aren't clear to you. 
Tolerance for Ambiguity
The -game that we are going to play now is made up
of sets of 10 cards. The first card of the 10 has only a
few lines of a complete picture; but each following card 
gives you a few more hints ~ a few more lines - as to what 
this picture looks like. Here is a list of names, one of 
these is the picture. I will leave the list out so you can 
see it. Remember there is only one picture in each set of 
cards. You don't have to guess on any card if you don't 
itfant to, but the object of the game is to see how soon you 
can tell what the picture looks like. You may look at each 
card as long as you wish. Here is a practice set of five
cards. Remember, the idea of this game is to see how few
cards you need to decide what the picture is.
(After the first response) We will go through 
the rest of the cards and if you want to change your answer 
you can.
Do you see how we play this game? OK, we will be­
gin now. Here is the list, read it over first.
Schematizing Test
We wish to see how well you can judge the size of 
squares. We're going to show you a number of squares on the 
screen and xie want you to tell us how big they are.
The squares may range anywhere between 1 inch and 
18 inches. This doesn't mean you'll necessarily get a 
square which is 1 inch or 18 inches, though you may. But 
the squares will always be somewhere within this range. (The 
1 inch square and the 18 inch square are exposed now for 
about 5 seconds each.)
We will show them to you again.
You will see 150 squares during the course of the
hour, and you have 150 numbered spaces on your sheet. Write
your estimation of the size of each square in its own num­
bered space. Thus for square number 1 record its size in
inches next to number 1, etc.
Don't go back over your judgments to change them,
In changing them you are more likely to be inaccurate.
Please don't compare your estimates with anyone or make any 
comment during the hour. Make your judgments independently.
Now to remind you once again of the range in which the squares 
fall, we will show you agin the smaller and the larger ends 
of the range.
In estimating the sizes of tge squares, you may 
use whole numbers, factions, or decimals, dependeing on how 
the squares look to you. The choice is entirely yours.
Nov; we are ready to begin. You will see each of 
the fo1 lowing squares for only a few seconds. Look a *■ it
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all the time it is on the screen and make your estimation 
when it disappears. The next square you see will be number 
1 .
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1) IQ
1. 64 
1.65 
1.25 
-1.30 
1.45 
-3.23 
- .93 
-1.79 
-1.70 
.02 
.82 
-1.69 
-1.89 
.52 
.00
APPENDIX G
Index Scores (N«60)
5.15 .62 - .22
-1.54 -2.33 2.73
1.35 2.33 -1.31
-2.13 .93 .53
.70 — .08 — .90
- .20 -1.28 - .30
1.34 .31 1.22
-2.49 3.63 - .98
1.03 - .08 .28
3.54 -1.83 - .41
-1.40 -2.21 -3.31
-3.51 - .29 -2.32
1.51 - .09 - .69
.38 - .82 - .49
.42 .13 - .30
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2) Creativity Index Scores
2.52 -2.41 1.26 .85
.13 2.00 -1.52 13.48
.00 .12 -1.06 -2.30
-2.32 -1.40 6.44 1.30
.15 .27 .29 -2.25
1.17 -1.68 -0.36 -1.81
-0.63 -0.25 -0.30 -1.39
-1.38 -1.77 .95 -1.50
-0.31 -1.17 -1.47 -1.98
-0.80 -1.15 .82 - .16
1.41 -1.46 - .67 -2.34
-0.46 -1.95 1.11 -1.21
0.07 -0.50 -1.65 -1.40
1.30 -3.16 - .65 -1.47
-1*35 .53 .35 9.05
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A P P E N D IX  H
1) Intercorrelations among all scores for the total 
sample- (N=>60)
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2) Intercorrelations among scores 
for high creativity Ss. HI Sjs 
LI Ss are above the median (N=
on cogniti 
are below 
15)
ve control tests 
the median and
1
1 3 i4 3 6 7 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 13 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 26 29
2 - .4 0 .37 .39 .29 -.2 1 -.0 1 .38 .01 .02 .39 .05 .24 - .o a .48 -.1 1 .44 .36 .36 - .2 9 — t ! .33 .12 - .1 4 .12 .21 .29 - .3 3 - .1 1
- .8 0 .71 .77 .41 .82 - .3 6 .25 - .2 6 .08 .46 - .0 7 - .1 0  - .2 3 .03 .11 - .0 7 — 03 -.2 1 - .1 4 .06 .19 -.1 1 -.3 1 .43 .46 - .0 7 .24 - .1 3
* - .9 4 .62 .80 .89 .34 - .0 9 .01 .07 .36 .35 .19 .12 - .1 3 .26 .12 - .0 8 - .2 2 — 18 .04 .33 .34 - .3 2 - .1 4 .47 .95 .25 - .1 6 - .1 7
- .3 6 .46 .37 .95 .21 .06 - .2 3 .21 .48 . . . .35 .3 3  - .0 4 .43 .04 - .0 9 - .2 4 - .0 9 .16 .48 .27 - .3 6 .09 .26 .60 .39 - .4 0 - .1 2
• - .3 0 - .2 0 .34 .33 .18 - .4 0 .02 - .3 3 .05 .22 -.1 1 - .2 7  - .7 0 - .3 0 .12 - .3 6 - .2 4 .06 .10 - .1 0 - .1 3 - .2 4 .53 .33 - .2 9 .49 - .0 .
.10 - .0 6 - .4 5 - .4 5 - .4 0 - .5 3 - .1 6 .95 .46 .08 .36 .1 3  - .1 4 .06 - .1 6 .28 - .1 9 - .0 4 - .3 3 - .2 7 .20 - .0 6 - .2 7 .39 - .3 4 .32 - .3 4 - .1 0
.37 - .2 0 - .3 2 - .2 9 - .2 4 -.2 1 .37 - .0 9 - .4 1 .1 4 - .3 4 - .3 0  .06 - .3 4 .3 7 .10 .27 .47 .02 - .4 1 .36 .06 - .3 3 .35 - .3 4 .20 - .1 0 - .2 7
.06 - .0 7 - .4 4 - .3 6 - .2 8 - .3 1 .97 .32 .57 .19 .43 .14 - .0 3 .12 - .0 7 .24 - .3 4 - .0 8 - .3 2 - .1 3 .18 -.2 2 - .2 2 .47 - .2 8 .41 - .4 0 - . 2 !
10 - .1 3 .16 - .1 3 .12 .24 - .4 3 .20 - .1 0 .26 .61 • 82 .48  - .0 1 .37 - .1 6 - .0 8 - .6 3 - .6 3 - .1 4 .40 -.2 7 - .1 6 - .0 4 .23 .21 .39 - .3 6 - .2 3
11 •03 .00 .00 .06 .03 .01 - .3 9 .33 - .3 0 - .2 0 .51 .16 - .1 6 .12 .27 .11 - .3 3 - .3 1 - .2 6 .14 .00 - .0 5 - .3 9 • 50 .19 .26 - .1 5 - .3 2
12 - .1 4 .16 - .1 1 .12 .24 - .4 2 .20 - .2 2 .27 .97 - .2 9 .3 4  .07 .46 - .2 9 .00 - .3 4 -.3 7 - .2 1 .30 - .3 9 .02 .09 - .0 4 .26 .38 - .4 0 - .1 9
13 .09 .36 .08 - .0 6 -.1 1 - .3 3 - .0 7 .06 .26 .09 .26 .24 .87 - .3 3 .03 - .0 6 -.0 1 .13 .07 - .0 6 - .3 0 .36 -.2 1 .33 .02 -.1 7
14 - .2 9 •37 .46 .42 .32 -.0 1 - .2 4 - .0 6 - .3 6 - .2  0 . . . » - .2 1 .09 .35 - .4 7 - .0 1 .01 .16 .17 .21 - .0 7 - .3 9 .37 -.08 - .0 4 .26 - .2 2 - .2 2
13 .07 .29 - .0 1 — 12 - .1 3 - .3 7 .03 .00 - .0 2 .26 - .0 6 .26 .9 3  .12 - .3 5 .23 .16 .15 - .0 9 .23 .05 - .3 3 .49 - .2 3 .62 .20 - .3 4
10 - .4 1 .04 .39 .24 .14 .44 - .2 4 .30 - .1 6 - .1 5 .38 -.2 2 .11 - .2 1 - .0 2 .08 -.2 1 .06 - .0 2 - .0 1 - .0 4 .19 - .4 4 .36 - .1 9 .06 .08 - .3 3
17 .07 .28 .10 .16 .16 - .1 7 .08 .14 .03 .37 - .1 6 .23 .1 9  .10 .08 - .2 2 .42 .47 - .6 2 - .1 9 .37 .10 - .1 3 .13 - .1 5 .13 - .2 0 - .0 3
to .31 .03 - .0 1 - .1 8 - .2 4 - .0 3 .03 .13 -.09 .16 -129 .10 - .2 2  .18 - .3 0 - .3 7 .51 .72 - .1 3 - .2 8 .33 .12 .22 - .3 8 .12 - .1 4 - .0 2
19 .14 - .4 3 .37 .02 .11 - .1 2 - .0 1 .10 - .2 4
30 .02 - .4 2 - .3 8 - .2 6 - .1 3 - .0 4 - .0 5 - .2 0 .00 .10 .13 .21 .09 - .3 0 .13 - .0 3 - .6 3 - .4 1 .09 .04 .06 - .0 4 .2 3 - .2 0 .18 .04 -.1 1
21 •18 .07 .39 .12 - .0 3 .51 - .2 1 - .0 1 - .3 1 - .3 1 - .3 6 - .3 3 - .1 2  .07 - .1 8 .00 .34 .34 .09 - .3 9 - .4 8 .00 .34 - .2 9 .40 .43 -.4 1 - .2 6
22 -.17 - .1 3 .34 - .1 7 . . . - .0 9
23 .22 -.2 7 - .1 0 .19 .30 .21 - .1 7 .12 - .1 4 - .3 2 - .0 3 - .3 5 - .2 8  - .1 2 - .3 3 - .1 0 .32 - .0 7 - .2 1 - .3 2 .35 - .4 2 - .4 6 - .1 9 - .1 3 .23 -.2 1 - .2 9
24 - .2 3 .4 3 .21 .02 - .0 7 -.2 8 - .0 3 .09 - .0 8 .42 .33 .34 .72 - .0 1 .39 .49 .18 -.0 7 .30 -.0 7 - .2 0 .43 - .3 4 - .7 5 .29 -.2 1 - .0 3
23 - .0 6 - .1 3 - .1 1 - .2 6 - .3 0 .04 .20 - .2 3 .16 - .0 4 - .2 9 .03 - .3 4  .20 - .1 7 - .3 5 - .3 1 .18 .10 .47 - .2 5 - .0 4 - .6 1 - .3 0 - .2 2 .23 .03 - .3 4
2 * .29 .09 .08 - .0 4 - .1 0 .05 .00 .22 .07 -.0 1 .23 - .0 1 .0 4  - .2 8 .03 .27 - .2 2 .02 - .3 6 - .0 2 .23 .30 - .2 1 .10 - .0 6 .08 - .1 2
27 .06 - .1 8 - .0 7 - .0 6 - .0 7 .11 .19 - .4 2 .27 - .0 1 - .4 7 .16 - .3 3  - .2 9 - .3 4 - .2 4 - .3 0 - .1 4 - .0 9 .16 .02 - .3 8 .16 - .4 0 .20 - .0 5 - .9 3 - .7 0
28 - .1 3 .37 .14 .23 •  23 - .2 5 - .1 8 .42 - .2 6 - .0 7 . . . - .2 1 .21 .33 .13 .19 .24 .14 .10 - .2 2 - .0 6 .37 - .0 2 .31 - .2 6 .06 - .8 0 .43
29 - .0 3 - .0 3 .00 - .0 6 -.07 .03 - .2 1 .28 - .2 9 .03 .31 - .1 0 .3 4  .12 .39 .20 .31 .16 .17 - .0 7 .03 .33 - .2 0 .37 -.1 1 - .0 8 -.9 2 .32
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3) Intercorrelations among 
for low creative £>_s^ HI 
Ss are above the median
scores on cognitive control tests 
Ss are below the median and LI 
(N=l5)
10 11 12 1}
-.3  3 - .4 2  - .3 9
.6 2  .71  .47
.70 .4 0
.79 .79
25
.09
> .o i
.39  .93
.38  .07  .06
-.0 9  .03 ' .13
-.2 6  - .1 3  - .1 8
-.0 3  .19 .33
- .3 0  - .3 4  - .3 3
.39  .4 6  .36
.28  .37 .20
.34  .4 8  .3 3
.12  .1 0  - .0 3
.22  .17 .08
- « ts :  - .1 2  - .1 3  - .1
.3 0  .08 - .2 0  - .0
-.1 6  - .0 2  - .1 7  - .6
.0 4  - .1 0  - .1 3
.1 0  .1 3  .27
.1 3  .3 3  .33
.1 6  .1 3  .09
-.01 .02 .11 -.1
• .17  .07
.1 4  .07  - .1
.1 4  - .2 9
.2 3  - .1 2
.1 3  .13
.0 3  .10
.47  .94
.33
.43
-.02 .39
.2 3  - .0 8  - .  
.00 .44
-.23  - .0 2
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
- .0 2  .4 0  .18 - .2 1  - . ( .17 - .2 4  - .2 4  .40
.19  .04
.18 .26  - .
.62 .3 3  - .
- .2 3  - .4 8  - .
- .2 4  - .3 4
.0 9  .33
-.2 8  - .0 7  - .
- .0 3  - .2 4  - .
- .2 4  ,0 9
.31  .0 0  - .
.26  .49
.31  .41
.0 3  - .6 3  - .
- .1 9  .00
.08  .10 
.37
- .1 8  - .  
- .4 7  - .
- .6 1  
- .4 8  - .
- .1 9  - .
.43 
.21 - .  
.39
- .2 3
-.11  - .
- .4 3  
.0 0  .08 
. .22
-.41
.02 .63
.14 .31
.4 3  - .3 9  - .
.38 .09
-.11 -.10 
.0 4  .2 4  - .
-.10 - .  
.12 .28 
.1 8  - .1 9  - .
.37 .30
-.16 .0 4  - .
.03  .10  - .
-.22 .12 - .
-.40  .18
-.12 .21
-.54  - .3 1
-.36 - .3 4  - .
-.52  - .3 1
-.19  .11 - .
-.09  - .2 6  - .
.04 - .
-.22 - .4 1  - .
.3 3  .66
• .28  - .2 4  - .
.2 3  .08
.04  - .3 9  - .
.62 .01
- .3 9  
.2 3  .47 - .
.2 3  .16
.20 - .0 3
- .1 5  
.21 .23
-.18  .02 
.3 4  - .4 1
.20 .08 .11
.27 .39 .32
- .1 6
- .6 0
- .7 2
.03 .16  .47 - .3 3
.00 .08 .33  - .3 0
.17 - .6 0  .33
.47 - .3 2  .60 - .4 8
.1 4  - .6 1  .29  .16
- .2 3  - .4 2  .31 - .0 4
.08  - .1 2  - .0 1  .06
- .1 2  - .3 4  .19
- .1 8  - .4 1  - .2 9  .32
- .4 7  - .3 2  - .2 4  .37
-.09  - .6 3  - .0 9  .30
- .2 9  .07  - .1 9  .09
.22  - .1 9  .11
>.06 - .0 9  .13
.16 - .4 1  .23
.1 0  - .1 0  - .0 4
-.3 1  
-.21 
- .0 4  
- .1 3
-.21 .37 - .1 9
- .2 0  .40 - .1 7
.1 4  - .1 0  .12 - .1 2
- .1 8  - .4 3  - .1 0  .68
..18 .41 .02 - .2 6
28 29
.20 - .1 7
-.72 .01
.33  - .2 6
- .0 4  - .2 8
- .2 8  - .3 6
.22 - .4 8
- .0 6  .03
.12  .07
- .1 8  .02
.17  .39
- .0 3  .36
.03 .33
.17 .33
.02 .13
.1 5  .60
.21 .04
- .0 9  .34
.45 .08
.28 .01
.07 .11
- .4 0  - .0 6 -
- .0 3  - .2 3
-.02 -.12
.31 - .0 8
- .2 3  .10
.0 0 .00
- .3 1  -.9 1
-.01
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4) Intercorrelations among scores on cognitive control tests. 
HC Sj^  are belox^ the median and LC Ss are above the median 
(N=30)
2 3 4 3 6 7 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
I - 0 9 - 0 4 -1 7 - 0 9 -1 6 -2 8 - 1 9 - 2 1 - 3 3 11 -4 1 36 05 22 08 29 48 39 •  21 03 12 - 2 4 -1 7 36 - 0  3 11 15 - 1 4
2 •  30 39 54 61 - 1 6 - 1 3 - 1 0 -1 8 -2 1 03 - 3 0 -1 6 -3 0 - 2 0 -2 2 05 04 03 03 -2 2 19 42 -2 7 -0 8 - 0 2 - 3 3 16 31
3 - 3 0 39 77 48 44 - 1 2 06 -2 1 - 3 3 - 1 6 -4 3 -0 9 - 4 3 - 1 5 -2 7 05 02 07 04 -0 8 24 19 20 -3 1 10 06 16 -0 8
4 - 4 2 36 79 82 27 01 21 -0 3 . - 0 8 01 -1 8 - 1 3 - 4 6 -1 7 - 3 2 09 -1 7 -1 3 06 13 11 22 21 - 3 4 26 02 03 - 0  3
S - 3 8 42 31 93 40 08 18 04 - 0 6 -0 7 - 1 9 -1 4 - 3 4 - 1 6 -4 2 - 0 9 - 3 6 •  23 08 27 •  13 02 16 - 1 5 26 OS -0 1 - 0 3
6 - 0 4 - 1 7 68 42 20 21 10 14 04 - 5 8 - 2 5 - 2 4 10 - 0 6 - 3 9 - 4 8 -2 7 -1 3 16 07 - 0  3 - 1 0 34 - 1 9 07 15 07 - 1 9
7 - 0 1 - 0 2 - 3 6 - 2 6 - 2 1 -4 3 57 94 36 00 31 02 - 2 0 11 -2 2 -1 5 - 3 3 -5 1 -0 8 -0 7 - 0 4 - 3 3 18 05 45 14 -2 7 •  11
• -0 1 -0 2 - 1 0 - 2 0 - 2 4 -1 1 13 44 16 23 13 - 1 8 -3 9 -1 2 - 1 8 07 -2 4 -4 4 -1 4 11 -0 7 - 0 9 19 - 0 6 24 12 10 - 1 6
9 - 1 0 - 0 3 - 3 3 - 1 8 - 0 9 - 3 9 96 14 35 -0 5 32 01 - 1 6 05 -1 7 - 1 6 -3 7 -4 7 -0 4 - 0 5 - 0 4 - 2 8 16 02 42 18 -4 1 - 1 4
- 3 4 12 -0 1 23 34 -1 7 32 - 2 5 40 04 90 06 24 28 13 - 1 5 - 1 3 - 1 4 19 -1 2 - 2 0 - 1 5 34 - 2 0 14 - 0  5 - 0 6 08
11 -6 2 10 16 2 0 18 09 - 1 8 25 -0 8 21 23 10 - 2 4 00 15 49 20 - 0 9 -3 2 19 - 1 3 - 2  5 - 1 5 32 - 0 5 12 04 - 0 9
12 - 1 9 15 - 0 5 17 29 - 2 4 28 - 3 6 36 94 05 19 16 31 19 05 04 •  05 13 - 1 0 - 1 0 •  23 31 -1 4 14 -0 7 -1 2 12
13 - 1 3 27 - 0 3 01 10 - 3 0 02 - 2 2 -0 1 37 16 37 06 86 -1 0 40 10 01 - 2 6 -0 3 01 - 3 4 25 04 12 - 2 0 08 27
14 -1 9 19 03 09 10 - 1 4 - 1 6 00 -1 4 -0 7 -1 6 - 0 4 19 37 36 -2 1 10 35 47 04 04 -2 6 04 15 - 1 2 06 -0 7 - 0 6
13 -1 1 33 01 04 12 - 3 3 05 - 1 6 05 31 03 34 89 26 - 0 6 25 08 05 - 1 2 - 0 3 10 - 4  5 36 04 12 - 0 5 00 12
1 6 ' - 2 5 - 0 3 23 17 0 9 26 - 2 3 34 - 1 5 - 1 8 42 - 2 6 - 1 9 - 3 3 - 2  5 - 0 6 14 15 18 - 2 3 08 -0 1 - 0 8 05 - 0 6 05 - 1 0 -0 7
17 12 34 04 08 06 -2 6 19 10 13 15 - 0 4 15 09 03 16 - 1 0 53 28 - 3 8 -0 1 15 -1 6 17 -0 1 15 •1 2 22 14
18 33 16 - 0 2 - 1 9 - 2 3 - 1 4 - 0 6 19 - 2 0 - 2 5 - 3 0 - 1 8 - 1 3 06 -0 6 -2 9 46 70 -0 9 - 1 8 24 03 - 0 4 0 3 05 - 1 9 48 11
19 19 22 - 0 5 -1 1 - 1 3 - 2 7 11 11 00 -0 1 - 3 6 08 12 12 16 -1 8 47 61 43 - I S 13 12 - 1 0 00 07 -0 2 25 01
20 02 - 3 8 - 2 8 - 1 6 - 0 3 00 -1 7 - 1 0 - 1 4 - 0 2 - 0 6 04 11 - 0 1 03 -0 2 - 6 3 - 2 9 09 01 00 12 - 0 8 - 0 8 12 •0 3 -1 1 06
21 10 06 31 24 17 33 - 1 6 - 2 0 - 1 9 03 - 2 0 04 - 0 5 13 02 - 0 5 13 17 00 - 3 3 - 4 6 09 - 0 6 04 - 1 0 13 05 - 1 3
22 -1 2 23 10 17 16 - 0 8 - 1 4 21 - 0 9 - 1 4 36 - 2 2 12 -0 7 17 28 01 - 0 4 - 0 4 19 - 4 7 -1 1 10 - 0 3 09 - 0 8 •  16 09
23 29 - 1 4 - 0 6 08 12 09 - 1 0 07 - 1 3 - 2 4 - 1 0 - 1 9 - 2 8 - 2 1 - 3 3 - 0 4 24 01 -0 7 - 2 3 29 - 3 5 - 2 4 - 5 1 - 0 4 -3 7 29 30
2 4 - 0 6 19 - 0 6 - 0 6 -0 1 - 2 6 - 1 6 - 1 0 - 1 5 17 - 0 7 21 52 24 53 07 00 08 18 07 02 15 - 5 0 - 6 9 08 -0 8 12 09
2 5 - 2 8 -0 6 11 00 - 0 8 17 25 04 27 09 20 -0 1 - 2 5 02 -2 1 - 0 3 - 2 0 - 1 0 - 0 3 18 -2 9 17 - 4 7 •  51 -1 1 37 - 2 6 - 3 4
26 20 12 15 06 00 10 - 0 2 10 04 04 11 05 10 -1 3 11 16 - 1  5 03 -2 3 00 28 21 - 1 6 10 -0 9 01 -0 8 03
27 - 1 5 -0 4 - 0 9 01 08 - 0 9 21 - 1 6 30 15 - 0 3 22 - 1 4 03 - 1 0 -1 1 -1 1  • -1 4 -0 5 12 12 -2 7 15 - 3 0 22 - 0 5 -6 3 - 9 8
28 09 08 19 07 - 0 4 17 - 2  5 17 - 3 2 - 2  2 10 - 2 9 -0 1 02 -1 2 14 00 05 -0 6 - 1 6 -2 1 13 -0 9 12 -1 1 02 - 8 4 51
29 14 -0 1 01 - 0 4 - 0 5 05 - 1 3 10 - 2  2 -0 1 - 0 3 - 0 8 21 - 0 3 27 02 20 22 21 - 0 4 04 30 - 1 7 39 - 2 4 - 0 3 -8 4 43
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5) Intercorrelations among scores on cognitive control tests.
HI Ss are below the median and LI _Ss_ are above the median
(N=30).
2 2 4 J 6 7 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 13 16 17 U  19 j o  21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
• 3 3  - 1 9  - 3 5  - 3 5  - 1 4  - 2 4  - 3 1  - 2 6  - 5 8  - 3 3  -4 1  12 08 09  18 11 45 28 -0 8  U  - 0 1  - 0 6  07 - 0 1  -1 2  08 09
- 0 7 31 35 39 04 16 29 10 - 0 4 17 - 1 0 01 - 2 9 09 -1 8 21 01 02 -0 7 -2 8 34 13 -0 1 - 0 6 16 13 -2 1 - 0 4
- 1 2 49 77 40 47 - 2 0 19 - 2 5 - 1 3 03 - 2 9 - 2 6 - 3 6 -2 2 - 1 0 - 1 6 -0 1 -0 6 00 - 1 4 21 21 01 - 1 3 30 -0 3 20 - 2 0
- 2 3 31 78 64 31 - 0 6 10 - 0 2 ' 11 17 - 0 3 - 1 9 - 3 1 -1 4 - 0 6 • 0  9 - 2 4 - 1 9 08 U 30 02 17 - 1 3 39 20 -11 -2 2
- 1 1 40 37 91 42 12 - 0 6 19 23 -OS 04 -1 1 -0 9 •0 2 - 1 6 - 2  3 -4 2 -2 7 18 31 16 -0 8 27 - 1 6 43 30 - 2 6 - 2 3
-0 1 - 3 7 42 18 10 10 04 04 05 - 3 7 - 3 1 -3 8 07 - 2 0 -4 1 - 3 9 - 2 8 -1 8 18 03 - 0 4 05 17 -1 7 09 02 17 - 2 9
- 0 3 - 2 0 - 3 2 - 3 3 -2 8 - 0 7 18 95 48 11 32 08 - 2 3 10 - 2 4 05 -2 2 -3 6 - 2 3 •  21 07 -1 7 01 14 - 1 4 08 -1 1 -0 1
16 - 2 4 - 2  3 - 1 9 , -1 1 40 18 00 22 -0 7 - 3 4 - 1 6 - 1 9 IS 12 03 -0 7 - 1 9 -3 2 31 -0 1 08 - 0 4 - 2  2 07 01 - 1 3
- 0 3 •2 2 - 3 3 - 2 8 - 2 4 -0 7 93 3 3 48 12 34 09 - 1 6 10 - 1 9 05 -3 1 -3 8 - 2 3 -0 8 03 - 2 4 00 20 -1 1 15 - 1 6 -0 7
- 2 0 - 0 6 - 2 4 - 0 3 00 - 1 6 31 - 0 9 36 43 66 17 •0 1 20 - 0 3 -0 7 - 3 6 -4 1 06 11 -3 1 -1 7 13 00 19 04 -0 7 10
26 02 - 0 3 11 20 - 0 4 - 1 9 26 - 1 8 •3 1 59 23 - 3 1 10 41 39 02 - 1 9 •  25 00 01 - 0 6 - 1 8 21 13 04 - 0  3 03
- 1 9 - 1 1 - 2 3 • 0 4 o o.- 0 7 34 - 1 5 39 97 - 3 5 27 - 0 3 27 02 17 - 1 3 •2 6 -0 1 18 - 2 6 -1 3 14 - 0  5 17 01 - 1 2 23
13 08 21 15 11 16 - 0 4 - 0 8 - 0 6 20 - 0 9 24 18 63 - 0 9 ‘  19 05 -0 7 - 1 7 - 1 0 -0 6 -3 8 09 16 37 - 0 4 - 1 5 29
- 2 7 03 •0 1 00 - 1 7 -0 3 -2 2 - 2 4 - 2 4 19 -0 8 17 04 37 - 1 0 - 1 6 -0 2 31 43 25 -1 7 -3 9 05 22 -0 7 19 -2 0 •  05
04 04 17 07 02 08 0 3 - 1 0 - 0 3 33 -1 4 34 89 29 - 2  3 20 14 -01 -1 9 00 03 - 5 2 23 16 39 09 -2 8 28
- 4 2 - 1 1 03 -0 7 - 1 9 10 - 1 7 03 -1 1 08 04 04 - 1 9 43 . - 0 3 13 07 13 07 02 -1 8 13 •2 8 13 - 0 7 -0 4 10 •  11
36 17 26 26 22 12 - 0 4 06 - 1 0 03 11 -0 2 32 03 23 - 3 2 43 26 -4 9 - 3 0 33 -0 9 -0 2 11 -1 4 08 •  19 11
39 16 03 - 0 7 - 1 5 -0 9 - 1 9 - 0 3 -2 7 03 -0 7 01 •0 9 28 - 1 0 - 1 6 58 68 -0 9 -2 7 31 - 0 5 07 -0 4 05 -0 7 - 0 3 23
32 19 09 - 0 7 - 1 0 -1 1 -0 1 - 1 5 -0 8 33 -2 2 32 18 16 18 - 0 9 48 62 39 - 2 0 27 03 - 1 6 13 - 0 5 11 - 1 7 05
- 1 4 -0 7 00 08 18 18 - 2 3 - 1 0 - 2 3 06 - 2  5 -0 1 -1 7 43 - 1 9 07 -4 9 - 0 9 39 19 -1 7 07 04 - 1 3 12 - 0 3 -0 2 10
27 00 33 17 10 31 - 0 5 08 -1 7 -1 7 12 - 2 1 06 - 1 4 01 - 2  7 39 25 05 - 3 5 -3 6 16 09 - 2 0 29 32 -3 2 -1 7
•  13 16 16 13 01 -0 4 -2 9 - 0 5 - 2 2 - 1 4 08 - 1 3 17 25 23 43 - 1 1 - 0 6 - 1 6 31 -5 2 - 2  2 06 16 -1 7 09 - 1 3 03
11 11 - 1 0 12 13 - 2 3 - 1 6 04 - 1 3 - 1 5 - 2 2 -2 2 - 2 6 - 1 6 -3 1 - 1 2 15 06 04 - 1 7 20 - 2 9 - 3 3 -3 8 - 0 4 11 - 0 8 - 1 9
- 2 0 - 0 7 13 - 0 2 -0 9 23 - 0 2 - 0 4 - 0 2 38 - 0 5 37 69 23 66 25 20 - 0 4 21 - 0 6 - 1 0 19 - 4 3 - 7 3 21 - 1 6 01 31
06 - 0 8 - 0 4 - 1 0 - 0 5 04 09 01 04 -2 2 30 - 1 6 -3 7 -0 1 - 2  9 - 1 3 - 3 0 00 -1 6 22 - 0  7 04 -5 7 -4 7 - 1 8 20 -0 6 -2  5
24 06 10 00 - 0 4 06 12 19 15 05 09 06 06 - 1 7 06 15 -1 0 04 -1 7 02 19 23 - 1 5 07 -0 8 02 -0 7 07
01 -2 7 02 00 00 24 24 - 1 3 32 07 -0 1 12 -2 9 -0 7 -1 9 - 0 3 - 2  5 • - 2 5 •  14 11 08 -3 4 - 0 9 - 2 5 34 - 0 3 -9 0 -6 8
02 32 13 20 20 - 1 5 - 1 4 30 - 2 4 -0 4 23 - 1 3 13 16 08 02 27 22 20 - 2 3 06 10 10 19 - 2 5 07 -7 0 33
- O l 17 - 0 5 -0 7 - 0 5 -1 7 -2 7 01 -3 3 -0 8 - 0 6 -1 1 35 00 23 -0 1 24 23 14 - 0 3 - 1 1 36 04 26 - 3 0 -0 6 - 9 4 45
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A P P E N D IX  I
1) Mean W scores (Stroop Colour-Word Test) for Four
Groups (N«=60)
.
CREATIVITY
High ; Low
High 55.87 54.26
(9.27) (9.70)
'ELLIGENCE --------
Low 53.60 51.93
(5.54) (6.63)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Creativity 40.01 1 40.01 .59
Intelligence 79.31 1 79.31 1.17
Interaction .01 1 . Q 1 .00
Within Cells 3804.00 56 67.95
f .90 d * 56) ” 2 *78
159
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2) Mean C Scores (Stroop Colour-Word Test) for the
Four Groups . (N=60)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low
Hi gh 98.33 94. 60
(18.07) (12.99)
INTELLIGENCE
Low 90.93 90.73
(16.16) (18.47)
7 .
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Creativity 58.70 1 58.70 .20
Intelligence 477.80 1 477.80 1 .63
Interaction 47.00 1 47.00 .17
Within Cells 16370.00 56 292.32
F ^90 (1,56) - 2.78
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3) Mean CW Scores (Stroop Colour-Word Test) for the
Four Groups (N=*60)
CREATIVITY
INTELLIGENCE
Hi gh Low
Hi gh 159.93 162.93
(45.08) (24.75)
LOW 146.33 146.53
(30.57) (29.68)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Crea tivi ty 38.45 1 38.45 .04
In tel1 igence 3374.00 1 3374.00 2.83*
Interaction 27.00 1 27.00 .02
Within Cells 66690.00 56 1190.89
*F .90 U , 5 6 )  - 2.78
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4) Mean C/(C+W) Scores (Stroop Colour-Word Test) for the
Four Groups (N=60)
CREATIVITY
High Low
High 63.40 63.07
(3.12) (5.27)
INTELLIGENCE
Low 62.53 60.60
(3.67) (14.68)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Creativi ty 4.27 1 4.27 .22
Intelli gence .01 1 .01 .00
Interaction 11.26 1 11.26 .59
Within Cells 1067.00 56 19.00
F #90 (1,56) ~ 2.78
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5) Mean Number of Errors (Scanning A) for the
Four Groups (N=60)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low
High
INTELLIGENCE
Low
1.0
(1 .2 )
1.2 
( .83)
1.3 
( .99)
.80 
( .65)
\
J
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Crea tivi ty 
Intel1i gence 
Interaction 
Within Cells
.27 1 
.07 1 
1.67 1 
53.53 56
.27
.07
1.67
.96
.28
.00
1.74
F .90 (1»56) " 2 *78
-
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6) Mean Number of Errors (Scanning B) for the
Four Groups (N=60)
c r e a t i v i t y
INTELLIGENCE
High Low
Hi gh 1.07 1.40
(.99) (1.67)
. ... .. .. 1
Low 2.00 1.60
(1.41) (2.06)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS , df MS F
Creativity 1.67 1 1.67 .63
Intel 1 i gence 4.82 1 4.82 1.81
Interaction 2.01 1 2.01 .75
Within Cells 149.10 56 2 o 66
.90 (1,56) « 2.78
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7) Mean First Correct Response (Tolerance for Ambiguity)
for the Four Groups (N=60)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low
High 4.23 4.15
(1.08) (1.23)
INTELLIGENCE
Low 4.17 4.82
(1.14) (1.17)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Creativi ty 1.23 1 1.23 .98
Intel1i gence 1.41 1 1.41 1.13
Interaction 1.95 1 1.95 1.56
Within Cells 79.88 56 1.25
f.90 (1*56) » 2.78
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
166
8 ) Mean Trial Correct Response Stabilizers (Tolerance for 
Ambiguity) for1 the Four Groups (N**60)
High
INTELLIGENCE
Low
CREATIVITY
High Low
6.19 5.35
(1 .2 0 ) (1 .1 0 )
5. 53 6.07
(.95) (1 .2 2 )
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Crea tivi ty .32 1 .32 .24
Intel 1i genee .01 1 .01 .00
Interaction 7.21 1 7.21 5*38
Within Cells 75.12 56 1.34
F .90 (i*56* ** 2.78
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9) Mean Percentage Pairs (Equivalence Range) for the
Four Groups (N«60)
CREATIVITY 
High Low
INTELLIGENCE
High 39.67 39.40
(24.72) (28.39)
Low 38.47 51.47
(26.12) (24.01)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of-Variation SS df MS F
Creativi ty 608.10 1 608.10 .85
Intel 1igence 443.10 1 443.10 .62
Interaction 658.00 1 658.00 .92
Within Cells 39950.00 56 713.39
F.9Q (1,56) = 2.78
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10) Mean Percent Perceptible (Object Sorting Test) for
the Four Groups (N=60)
CREATIVITY 
H i gh Low
INTELLIGENCE
High 32.60 22,26
(31.66) (23.79)
Low 22.67 13.27
(18.08) (17.51 )
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Creativi ty 1459.00 1 1459.00 2.49
Intel 1 i gence 4.00 1 4.00 .00
Interaction 1343.00 1 1343.00 2.28
Within Cells 32800.00 56 585.71
F .90 (1,56) » 2. 78
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11) Mean Percent Functional (Object Sorting) for the
Four Groups (N»60)
CREATIVITY
High Low
High 40.93 44.47
(24.84) (25.91)
T N TK T.T.T fiENfE
Low 44.27 44.87
(26.84) (24.05)
ANALYSIS
I '
OF v a r i a n c e
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Creativity 64.42 I 64.42 .09
Intelligence 52.40 1 52.40 .08
Interaction 31.50 1 31.50 .05
Within Cells 38670.00 56 690.54
F .90 ^ » 56> “ 2 *78
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12) Mean Percent Nominal (Object Sorting Test) for the
Four Groups (N®60)
‘ CREATIVITY
High Low
High 23. 40 32.13
(27. 30) (29.00)
INTELLIGENCE
Low 29. 93 40.20
(25. 61) (27.13)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Crea tivi ty 1353.00 1 1353.00 1.71
Intel 1igence 799.70 1 799.70 1.01
In terac ti on 7.30 1 7.30 .01
Within Cells 44240.00 56 790.00
F #9o (1,56) - 2.78
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13) Mean Percent Fiat Equivalence (Object Sorting Test)
for the Four Groups
CREATIVITY
INTELLIGENCE
High Low
High 1.67 .40
(6.23) (1.50)
Low . 33 .00
(1.25) (.0 0 )
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS
Creativi ty 
Intel 1 i gence 
Interac tion 
Within Cells
9.60 1
11.26 1 
3.24 I 
636.90 56
9.60
11.26
3.24
11.37
.84
.99
.29
F.9 o (1,56) - 2.78
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14) Mean Percent Superordinate Grouping (Object Sorting
Test) for the Four Groups (N»60)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low
High 79.40 81.60
(25.41) (23.42)
INTELLIGFNCE
Low 85.40 92.60
(19.84) (5.85)
■ - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Creativi ty 333.10 1 333.10 .77
Intel 1 i gence 1084.00 1 1084.00 2.52
Interac tion 90.00 1 90.00 .21
Within Cells 24100.00 56 430.36
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15) Mean Percent Cotnpl exive Grouping (Object Sorting Test)
for the Four Groups (N«60)
CREATIVITY
Hi gh Low
Hi gh 5.60 1.67
(11.63) (3.53)
INTELLIGENCE .. ... .
Low 5.87 .87
(12.80) (2 .2 2 )
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Creativi ty 299.20 1 299.20 3. 54
Intelligence 4.13 1 4.13 .05
Interac tion 1.07 1 1.07 .01
Within Cells 4732.00 56 84.50
F. 90 (1 , 56) - 2. 78
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16) Mean Percent Thematic Grouping (Object Sorting Test)
for the Four Groups (N«60)
CREATIVITY 
Hi gh Low
INTELLIGENCE
High 12.93 
(17.01 )
14.80 
(18.61 )
Low 6.67 
(7.64)
5.73
(6.23)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Creativi ty 3.27 1 3.27 .02
In tel1igence 880.50 1 880.05 4. 50
Interaction 30.30 1 30.30 1.55
Within Cells 10950.00 56 195.54
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